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Abstract: In this thesis, main concern is how to approach the Muslim population in Europe in terms 
of citizenship and public sphere. I have chosen these two themes for a particular reason: through the 
discussions of the themes, my aim is to characterize the degree and scope of political participation 
of Muslims in Europe. To achieve this goal, I have tried to compare different notions of selfhood 
and the public to show the differences and similarities between different traditions. In the literature 
on Muslims in Europe, an observation has gradually become salient: the emergence of a Euro-
Islamic public sphere that denudes the national identities but at the same time reinvigorates a 
transnational socio-religious movement. The process has reinvigorates two important impacts re-
conceptualization of minority status in Islamic law and the re-construction of the notions of public 
sphere and modernity in liberal political theory. 
 
Abstract: Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich damit, wie die muslimische 
Bevölkerung in Europa im Hinblick auf Staatsbürgerschaft und Öffentlichkeit behandelt wird. Ich 
habe diese zwei Themen aus einem bestimmten Grund gewählt: mit der Diskussion dieser Themen 
möchte ich den Grad und die Bandbreite der politischen Partizipation von Muslimen in Europa 
charakterisieren. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, habe ich versucht, verschiedene Auffassungen von 
Individualität und Öffentlichkeit zu vergleichen, um die Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zwischen 
verschiedenen Traditionen aufzuzeigen. In der Literatur über Muslime in Europa hat sich nach und 
nach eine Betrachtungsweise in den Vordergrund geschoben: die Entstehung einer Euro-Islamischen 
Öffentlichkeit, welche die nationalen Identitäten verschwinden, aber gleichzeitig eine transnational 
sozio-religiöse Bewegung neu aufleben lässt. Dieser Prozess hat zwei wichtige Wirkungen: die 
Rekonzeptualisierung des Minderheitenstatus im islamischen Recht und die Rekonstruktion der 
Auffassungen von Öffentlichkeit und Moderne in der liberalen politischen Theorie.  
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                                                 Part A   
                        Introduction      
 I. A Cursory Background of the Issues 
 Although different Muslim societies have been in contact with different European societies 
for centuries, researches on the Muslim communities that live in Europe are phenomena that we 
observe only in recent decades.
1
  
 The thesis will be based on two theoretical positions which gradually dominate the studies 
on Muslim communities in Europe: Public Sphere and Political Liberalism. By public sphere in the 
context of Muslim communities in Europe, it is meant the entrance and implications of Islam into 
the formation of European public sphere. Recently, we observe an increase (or an expansion from 
―private to public‖ or ―de-privatization of religion‖ in Jose Casanova's terms.) in the religious and 
political consciousness of the communities.
2
 Discussions about mosque building processes, 
headscarve and caricature crisis show the limits of a labor and migration oriented approach. 
Following Salvatore, I will approach to the issue of Islam and Europe in a broader context: I will 
question the role of Islam in formation of a European public sphere. The role of religion in public 
sphere is elaborated by Casanova in terms of confrontation and transformation: 
 
By entering the public sphere and forcing the public discussion or 
contestation of certain issues, they (religions) force modern societies 
to reflect publicly and collectively on their normative structures. 
….but in the very process of entering the modern public sphere, 
religions and normative traditions are also forced to confront and 
possibly come to terms with the modern normative 
                                                 
1  Kepel (1997: 48) stresses the lack of the social scientific interest on Muslim populations in Europe, qua 
Muslims, prior to the 1980s. (Grillo 2004) 
 
2  By change in the consciousness, I do not only refer to the Muslim communities, but also general ―political im-
portance‖ that religions have gained.  
 2 
structures.(Casanova 2001: 1048- 1049)  
 
 I want to emphasize that confrontation and transformation in public sphere should be 
considered simultaneously at the level of norms and traditions. The parochial capacity of a tradition 
to become part of different social fields could induce an attempt either to refuse or to revitalize the 
tradition's argumentative and symbolic resources. (Salvatore 2004: 1025)  Question of how and 
where normative Islam enters into the formation of public sphere implies to the very struggles that 
define the borders between religious and secular fields.  Salvatore perceptively foresees an 
emergence and functioning of a ―Euro-Islamic Public sphere‖ through which the value issues are 
shifted from symbolic representation at the hand of state or its cultural core to the real and complex 
terrain of production. (Salvatore 2007b: 142)  
 Since we are talking about a transnational Euro-Islamic public sphere, the link between 
public sphere and nation state should be taken into consideration. The theory of public sphere 
originally was devised under the Westphalian political imaginary to the extent that the public sphere 
should be in line with a sovereign power.
 
Transnational space that religion occupies, on the other 
hand, has disruptive impacts on the territorially bounded political imaginaries.
3
Nevertheless, 
focusing only on the correlation between public sphere and nation-state will hinder recognition of 
the discursive shaping of the common good. (Salvatore 2007b: 48) Common good and 
discursiveness are two important elements in discussions of a Euro-Islamic public sphere. Islam as 
discursive tradition is identified by its own rationality or styles of reasoning and diversity of Islam 
                                                 
3   Casanova approaches to the issue on normative level, that the intrinsic value of the common good in religion  
is in tension with the nation-state: 
       Religions remind both states and their citizens of the human need to subordinate 
the logic of state formation to the 'common good'. Moreover, transnational religions 
are in a particularly advantageous position to remind all individuals and all societies 
that under modern conditions of globalization, the common good can increasingly be 
defined only in global, universal human terms, and that consequently, the public 
sphere of modern civil societies can not have national or state boundaries. (Casanova 
2001: 1049) 
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in various local manifestations is organized by the discursive tradition; a set of well-defined and 
universally accepted foundational texts
 
and interpretive techniques in Islam that ultimately 
determine the constraints and flexibilities in public reasoning. (Anjum 2007: 659-662) 
  European intellectual trajectory has largely ignored to establish an epistemic relationship 
with the Islam, Renate Holub argues.
4
  She identifies a typology of intellectuals' views of future of 
the Europe in relation to Islam: 1- European public intellectuals who deals with the problems of the 
migration and citizenship in general in their work, while ignoring Islam and Muslim population; 2- 
Right wing intellectuals who defends the position that the immigrants from Muslim majority 
countries cannot be assimilated or integrated; 3- Middle strata intellectuals, including journalists 
who readjust the message of the second group in line with the discourses of the political leaders; 4- 
Organic intellectuals emanating from or having close relations with the migrant populations, who 
assert their knowledge and cultural traditions that diverge from Europe into public discourse. Holub 
contends that the participation of organic intellectuals will force the European intellectuals to 
rethink and critique the project of modernity. (Holub 2007)  
We can approach Tariq Ramadan as one of those organic intellectuals who play an important 
role in the formation of Islam in Europe. He is in favor of a rereading of foundational texts within 
the light of European experience to situate and to relate Muslim migrant minorities with the basic 
principles of Sharia law. In another words, he tries to identify the Muslim predicament in liberal 
democratic society by calling the European environment as the ―Abode of Testimony‖ (Dar al -
Shahada) instead of applying orthodox view of ―Abode of War‖ (Dar al – Harb) or ―Abode of 
Proselytizing‖. (Ramadan 2005) According to him, European environment is a space of 
responsibility for Muslims, to contribute wherever they are, to promote good and equity within and 
                                                 
4  A possible reason for this intellectual blindness is the assumption that Western Civilization has its roots in 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Jurgen Habermas argues for this ―rootedness‖ in an interview with Eduardo Mendiata. 
(Habermas 2002: 157) A symbolic title was chosen for the related section in his book: ―Jerusalem, Athens and Rome‖. 
Charles Taylor, however, argues otherwise by speaking ―unbridgeable gulf between Christianity and the Greek 
Philosophy‖. (Taylor 2007; quoted in Asad 2008) A broader definition of Western civilizational space is as follows: ―the 
Abrahamic traditions and the Hellenic political and cultural heritage.‖ (Salvatore 2007c) 
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through human brotherhood. (Ramadan 2005: 150) Andrew March reads the attempts of Ramadan 
as the search for an ―overlapping consensus‖ which is compatible with the principles of political 
liberalism. (March 2007)  
 Political liberalism which is the second major theoretical influence on the literature is 
resonant with the ―Islamic bid for justice.‖ Discourse of justice in Ramadan (yet not exclusively) is 
based on the rights and citizenship. It is a response to the ―disaggregation of citizenship.‖5 
Contemporary Europe witnesses a process that ―entitlement to social rights is replacing the exercise 
of democratic citizenship.‖ (Benhabib 2002: 453) Coming from migration background, Ramadan 
represents a ―cosmopolitan political agency‖ who strives for more political rights, not just at the 
level of   institutions, but at normative and cognitive level by both urging Muslim migrants to locate 
themselves in Europe ( in terms of identity and belonging) and to be part of ―Umma.‖  
 Relevancy of political liberalism in understanding the contemporary predicament of Muslim 
communities in Europe boils down to the issue of Islamic affirmation of citizenship in non-Muslim 
liberal societies. Central features of such an affirmation are that it should be acceptable from a 
liberal standpoint and be adequately tenable to believers. Distinction between citizen and alien (who 
does not participate politically in society) and avoidance from the latter correspond to the political 
agency Ramadan asks since the political liberalism requires public justification. (March 2006: 383)  
 In conclusion, my approach to the presence of Islam in Europe will be closer to the 
Salvatore and Holub. Interactions and conflicts that create a ―European Islam‖ also create the 
Europe itself. And intellectuals and ordinary people equally play crucial role in this double 
formation process.   
                                                 
5   Benhabib mentions that throughout Europe a decoupling of national and cultural origin from the privileges of 
political membership is visible.  (Benhabib 2002:  453-460) When stressing the ―political incorporation through 
immigration‖, she notes a tension (or a contradiction) at the heart of the norms and practices of liberal democracies 
regarding the political incorporation: a tension between the commitments of liberal democracies to universal human 
rights on the one hand, and sovereign self-determination claims on the other.  This maybe also the reason why 
sometimes Islam in general and Ramadan in particular are treated with suspicion.  Designation of the ―national‖ 
community as closed social system under the authority of territorially bounded sovereign is in conflict with a 
democratic but at the same time transnational political agency.    
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II. Objectives and Research Questions 
 As it was stated above, the general frame of investigation is the role of Islam in formation of 
European public sphere.  More specifically however, I want to contemplate on whether the new 
forms of a socio-political agency which emerges out of Muslim communities in Europe contributes 
to the critical reexamination of secularity and citizenship. Sociological observation that forms this 
new form of agency comes from young generations of the Muslim migrant communities who 
differentiate from earlier generations by their tendency to establish a direct relationship with the 
main sources of Islam. (Namely Quran and Hadith) Here I should reflect more on the concept of 
Islam as discursive tradition for the reason that I do not refer to the differentiation between younger 
and earlier generations to remind the dichotomy of Modernity vs. Tradition.
6
 Two different kinds of 
authority are in struggle when the younger generation rejects experience of Islam in their families; 
authority of Muslim orthopraxis / tradition and authority of the tradition which is based on 
particular national backgrounds.
7
  
The questions that I will try to seek an answer are:  
 Where does this ―newness‖ come from? To what extent can we talk about this new agency? 
Why is it relevant to scrutinize the kind of subjectivity that I am talking about? One of the 
central premises of the study is that the ―critical reexamination‖ (of secularity and citizenship) is 
possible through the pluralization and hybridization of public sphere which is concomitant of 
                                                 
6  Orthodox Sunni Islam has emerged as lay ecumene of ―managed disagreement‖ in public reasoning.  
(Salvatore 2007c: 140) Thus, opposing interpretation is still within the confines of the Orthodoxy.  A frequently cited 
example of ―managed disagreement‖ and also one of the key defining moments in early Islamic history was on the two 
opposing conceptions of justice during the ―Battle of Camel‖ in 636. I will not look into historical details or narration, 
as far as our topic is concerned, the main source of conflict was between relative justice (adalet-i izafiye) and pure 
(ultimate) justice (adalet-i mahza) in determining the common good. (or the appropriate ―Ijtihad‖) Although different 
understandings of justice led to the war, both sides are revered by the Muslims today on the ground that they were 
deliberating to arrive at a decision which is closest to the reason and faith. 
 
7  I don‘t subscribe to the Durkheimian understanding of the ―social fact.‖ Logic of action is shaped and 
transformed by the both normative order and lived experience. In our context, discursivity allows flexibility to the 
religious practice.     
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transnationalization processes. How have the problems of transnational Islam and Europe 
started to be linked by both Muslim and non- Muslim voices?    
 What are the connections between this new type of agency and ―reconstruction of Muslim 
traditions‖ which was observed in 19th century of the Egypt, India and Ottoman Empire? The 
project of reform which was designed by the public intellectuals and governors reexamined the 
traditional forms of Islamic reasoning to promote education, collective welfare, economic 
development, and public morality. (Salvatore 2004: 1016) The argument is that reconfiguration 
of Islamic reasoning / Muslim traditions via press, public discussions, sermons, coffee house 
circles did not turn the traditional norms of self, community and authority into modern model of 
personal responsibility and loyalty to the nation state. Islamic reform kept a high level of 
indeterminacy and distrust towards secular modern state.  I will try to establish connections 
between reproduction / reemergence of Islamic legal knowledge in the field of minority law 
(―Fiqh al- aqalliyyat‖ which deals with Muslim loyalty, citizenship and residence in non- 
Muslim majority countries) and so called ―failure‖ of reformist intervention in Muslim 
traditions. 
 How does this agency subvert the ―traditional‖ constructions and dichotomies of religion / 
politics and public / private sphere and critically reconstruct them? What I have in mind is the 
tension between European secularity which is based on ―specific forms of power‖ and 
distinctive fears of authority on one side and Muslim actors in European public sphere with their 
justice claims on the other. This question is important for me to understand the reconfiguration 
of secularity and citizenship, because the more migrants dissociate themselves from the closure 
of ―foreignness‖ and enter into political space in the ―host‖ country; the more they are expected 
to exhibit the very same ―rules of game‖ which is formed through specific forms of power. (I 
mean the Wars of Religion and results of Westphalia Peace or briefly ―Westphalian political 
imaginary‖)   
 In the making of Muslim public space, to what extent does the discourse on ―justice based 
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citizenship‖ relate to the ―Muslim techniques of power‖?  What kind of concepts do Muslim 
actors use when they refer to the justice?  
 Empirical appearance of the new type of agency is relational, interactional and event based. 
Hence, the  encounter between the secular and the pious is formative and constitutive even 
though it is ―agonic‖ in the account of Salvatore's dialogic public sphere and it requires 
overcoming of ―cognitive dissonances‖ in the ―complementary learning processes‖ of 
Habermas. However, for the sake of argument, when we assume that pious and the secular as 
two distinct categories, we inevitably search for the limits of these categories: secular has its 
own formation in history so it depends on the Westphalian political imaginary that I have 
mentioned above, the pious has its own tradition and roots of authority (text, revelation etc.) and 
the argument goes on, the secular in contemporary world has the power so it is the one to 
―show‖ the pious what realistic condition for exit are in the modern world. Main problem with 
these categorically two distinct approaches is that the possibilities for reconciliation (and for a 
pluralist public sphere) are limited in the sense that two categories are designed to have their 
own ―structural‖ limits. For that reason, I find Rawlsian reading of Muslim presence in Europe 
relevant in articulation of Islamic affirmation of citizenship to ameliorate the ill effects of the 
disaggregated citizenship by focusing on the common good.  
 
  
 III.Methodology 
 The study will be a normative and interpretative discussion of Orthodox Islam in European 
context. The reason that I have chosen these two methods is that I focus on understanding and 
meaning making processes rather than explanation. Hermeneutical inquiries on ―Muslim 
orthopraxis‖ are also important part of the discussions. I will take arguments mostly from two 
theoretical positions which gradually dominate the studies on Muslim communities in Europe: 
public sphere and political liberalism. Main sources will be the literature on migration and historical 
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studies on secularity, citizenship in Europe and on transformation processes in late 19
th
 Ottoman 
Empire and Egypt. I am primarily interested in ideas behind the social and political changes.  
 Since the study is a qualitative inquiry; interpretation, hermeneutics (and social 
constructionism) will be applied as a tool to justify the arguments. I will try to discover the 
underpinnings of 'meaning-making processes' of the subjects. By doing this, I assume that there 
certain meanings in human action. This assumption comes from the interpretative tradition that 
involves what a particular action means, requiring that one interpret in a particular way what the 
actors are doing. (Schwandt 1994,  p.191) Maybe the most important tool that I will use is the 
'heuristic inquiry'. It is a kind of phenomenological inquiry that give the utmost importance to the 
personal experience and insights of the researcher. In regarding to some phenomenon of interest, the 
researcher asks, 'What is my experience of this phenomenon and the essential experience of others 
who also experience this phenomenon intensively?.' (Patton 2003, p.459) For that purpose, I ask 
what the meaning of being citizen is for a Muslim in Europe. Similarly, in the third part, I try to 
understand the meaning of political activism and communication in a secular / liberal context from 
the perspective of Muslims.  
 Michael Quinn Patton claims that there are two focusing elements of heuristic inquiry within 
the larger framework of phenomenology; (a) the researcher's personal experience and connection  
with the study subject, and (b) others who share an intensity of experience with the study topic 
participate in the inquiry. (Patton 2003, p.460) I can argue that the writing process is also a self-
discovery and positioning with regard to the problems that the study aims to investigate. It is 
emphasized that a heuristic inquiry is concerned with meanings, not measurements; with essence, 
not appearance; with quality, not quantity; with experience, not behaviour. (Douglas and Moustakas 
1985, p.42, cited in Patton 2003) Hence I am not primarily interested in statistical information or 
quantitative measurements; rather I am engaged with a system of meanings that are behind the 
behaviour. The relation between me and the issue that the thesis explores are obviously connected 
through the semantic source and environment in which I live.  
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Part B 
Citizenship in Muslim Communities of Europe: A Conceptual 
Investigation 
                  
   
 This part is an attempt of reading the contemporary predicament of Muslim communities in 
Europe through the broad theoretical frames of citizenship. It will try to analyze the reconfiguration 
of rights discourse that leads us to consider postnational citizenship phenomena as a development 
that obscures the boundaries of the Westphalian system of political order. After comparing the two 
different kinds of human subjectivities, namely ‗modern responsible agency‘ and Islamic concept of 
selfhood, and examining their implications for the citizenship practices of the migrant communities, 
I argue that there is a close connection between these two different notions of selfhood and the way 
Muslim migrant communities politically engage in the European societies. 
 
KEYWORDS: immigration, postnational citizenship, modern responsible agency, discursive 
tradition. 
  
                 I. Citizenship and Immigration:  Changing Parameters   
             How does immigration influence the traditional notions of citizenship in a 
contemporary liberal democracy? In what ways do immigrants shape (and are shaped by) the realm 
of the citizenship? Heavily determined by the nation-state boundaries, the democratic political 
agency in Europe is gaining new impetus from the migrant communities to transform the 
conventional acts of citizenship, that at the end forces us to rethink the politics dependent on nation-
state boundaries. In this section, I will deal with the questions that migration in general and Muslim 
communities in particular poses regarding the limits and contents of a liberal democratic 
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citizenship.  
  Postcolonial and labor immigration after second world war to European countries 
have been subject to numerous studies that compare the relative success that immigrants have 
displayed in the host countries' economic life with the failure of political and social 'integration' 
which are still an issue of contention. Especially if we consider the ethnic-genealogical citizenship 
traditions that confine the political space to particular historical formations of culture and nation-
state, the existence of failure makes sense. Brubaker (1990) has showed, in a comparative study of 
how the historical development of the country shapes the citizenship law in the case of France and 
Germany, that French conception of nationhood has been universalist, rationalist, assimilationist 
and state-centered, while the German conception of nationhood has been particularist, organic, 
differentialist and Volk-centered. This is because the latter‘s idea of national feeling developed 
before it is nation-state, making ethnocultural unity the base of the state, unlike the former‘s 
assimilationist citizen formation processes which are coming from early nation-state formation. 
Brubaker concludes that different historical traditions also made the two countries‘ citizenship 
admission processes different; a substantial portion of postwar immigrants in France transformed 
into French citizens while the naturalization rate in Germany is much lower.
 
(1990, p.398) This 
shouldn‘t be seen as a success story of one tradition in contrast to another. Rather, in French case, 
gaining full citizenship rights do not give one full political membership rights as I will argue later. 
Traditional forms of citizenship are challenged by the migratory movements and they are leading 
towards new directions despite the persistence of historical formations that Brubaker describes. In 
an article which explores the implications of transnationalization for citizenship and culture, Faist 
identifies three concepts of immigrant adaptation with their distinct equivalents of citizenships: 
'assimilation' to a unitary political culture in a single nation-state, 'ethnic pluralism' as the 
recognition of distinct cultures to multicultural citizenship, and 'border-crossing expansion of social 
space' as enhancing individual and collective identities to dual citizenship and dual nationality. He 
asserts that these three forms of formal citizenship are more or less related to the nation-states‘ 
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unitary assumption that (forcefully) connects one people to one territory and one cultural space. 
(Faist 2000, p.204)   
  Perhaps one of the most important studies that examines immigration and its 
influence on citizenship in postwar Europe is Soysal's postnational model of membership that 
focuses on the processes that blur the ―nation states' congruity assumption.‖8 (Soysal 1995) While 
deprived of formal citizenship, 'the guestworkers' have acquired full civil and social rights (such as 
family unification, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, retirement benefits, 
health insurance, unemployment compensation.) through the thrust of transnational human rights 
regime and discourses. So it is not the national cultural space that provides a repository for 
belonging now, but the universal human rights discourses that sustain the membership for 
immigrants in nation states. Soysal argues that in the nation-state mode of political community, 
national belonging creates the source of rights and duties of individuals; and citizenship is marked 
by national collectivity. The postwar era, however, has witnessed a flourishing reconstruction of 
(national) citizenship rights as human rights. Rights that were once linked with belonging in a 
national community have become increasingly detached from national context, and legitimated at 
the transnational level. (Soysal 2000, p.5; Joppke 1999, p.630) One of the possible consequences of 
this process is the disaggregation of citizenship rights into; collective identity, privileges of political 
membership and social rights and benefits. One can have one set of rights and claims without the 
other: one can have political rights without being a national, as is the case of the EU; frequently, 
however, one has social rights and benefits (health insurance, unemployment compensation etc.), 
for being a foreign worker, without involving in the same collective identity or holding the 
privileges of political membership. Disaggregation of rights leads to the emergence of   ‗permanent 
alienage‘, namely the creation of a group in society that shares property rights and participates in 
civil society without having access to political rights. (Benhabib 2002, p.454-55)  
                                                 
8  Benhabib reads this ‗congruity assumption‘ in a Weberian ideal typical model: ―Following Max Weber, we may say 
that this unity of residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation and cultural membership constitutes 
the ‗ideal typical‘ model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the West.‖ (Benhabib 2002, p.454) 
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  Maybe the most important distinction in terms of political membership in EU is the 
distinction between third country nationals and citizens of the member states of the Union. EU 
citizens can vote, run for and hold offices in both local and Union wide elections, while this is not 
possible for third country nationals although permanent legal residents (second generations and 
afterwards) are born and have lived their entire life in the host country. However, there are 
exceptions to this distinction: Third country nationals in Finland, Denmark, Holland and Sweden 
have a right to attend in local and regional elections, in Ireland it is only local elections but not 
regional, in UK the commonwealth citizens can vote in national elections. (Benhabib 2002, p.460) 
This distinction between EU citizens and third country nationals has concentrated on the restrictive 
regulations in political decision making processes. Social rights (like retirement pensions), civil and 
cultural rights (like right to establish associations and speaking native languages) are perceived as 
inviolable individual rights that must be granted, the political rights, on the other hand, is 
exclusively for the nationals of the respective states.   
  Naturally, one wonders about the roots of 'postnational membership.' Why are the 
social and civil rights given while the political rights (formal citizenship, voting rights) are difficult 
to access? In articulating this question, one can recognize the asymmetrical power relations between 
the parties: immigrants, permanent resident aliens (or denizens), asylum seekers are given rights as 
'passive subjects' which has to be 'incorporated' into the national community. Benhabib notes the 
'hiatus' between the self-understanding of liberal democracy and its restrictive practices that 
regulate the entry into and exit from political space. (Benhabib 1999, p.727) The diagnosis that the 
liberal democratic citizenship is 'disaggregated' into different rights regimes for different groups 
does not explain why the political citizenship is made difficult for immigrants. Could this difficulty 
be attributed to the same compromise that T. H. Marshall argued for the 20th
 
century's expansion of 
social rights that were crucial to the working class's progressive integration in British society? It 
was claimed that the development of welfare policies aimed at mitigating the impact of 
unemployment, sickness and distress was elementary to political and social stability. (Leydet 2009) 
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So could we claim that the 'decoupling' of social rights from political rights implies achieving the 
political stability at the cost of an exclusionary citizenship regime?  
  The answer is partly in the self-understanding of the liberal democracy which is 
shaped by the 'Westphalian political imaginary.' As an event, Westphalia refers to the peace 
settlement formed at the end of the Thirty Years Wars, (1618-1648; initially started within the Holy 
Roman Empire and then all major European powers involved.) which also served as structural 
frame for world order that has existed till today. (Birth of modern system of territorial sovereign 
state and raison d'état are taken as the legacy of Treaty of Westphalia.) As an idea, Westphalia points 
to the state-centric character of world order based on full participatory membership being conferred 
solely to territorially based sovereign states. (Falk 2002, p.312) In this system of orders, territorial 
sovereignty determines the boundaries of political membership. As a political imaginary, Westphalia 
not just shaped the institutional state system but also political mobilization in nation state. It is 
claimed that this political imaginary informed the postwar framing of debates about justice in 
Europe, even as the beginnings of a post-Westphalian human-rights regime appeared. (Fraser 2005, 
p.70) However, as it is stated at the outset, I am trying to answer the question of how immigration is 
changing the conventional practice of citizenship. Juxtaposition of post-Westphalian human rights 
regime which is upheld by international law and nation state with its unilateral power claims creates 
tensions that characterize the transformation process of citizenship practices. (by which the citizens 
are able to influence and change the political decision processes, they are both authors of the law 
and are subject to it.)  
  ‗Westphalian political imaginary' is challenged by the postnationalization processes 
by which it is meant increasing density of global migration and emergence of supranational entities, 
(such as EU and direct effect rule of European Court of Justice in the first pillar that overrides 
member state law.) and increasing influence of human rights discourse. When we talk about 
immigrants in European Union countries, national citizenship or formal nationality is no longer a 
crucial construction in terms of how the citizenship is transformed into the rights and privileges.  
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Although it is not possible to claim the waning of the formal citizenship, the postnational condition 
has begun to effect the reconfiguration of rights.  Claims-making and participation are not 
unquestionably accompanying to the national order of things. (Soysal 2004) New forms of 
mobilizing and enhancing claims beyond the umbrella of national citizenship are witnessed among 
the migrant communities of Europe. This largely happens due to the postnationalization processes 
that shakes the national citizenship as sole signifier of political membership. By national 
citizenship, I mean the status of a member of the society in terms of playing a role in decision 
making or self governance processes. Soysal (2004) claims that while collective groups increasingly 
mobilize around claims for particularistic identities, they connect their claims to transnationally 
institutionalized discourses and agendas of human rights. I will try to analyze the argument through 
a recent case. 
 
 II. El-Sherbini Case: Not for Hijab but for Human Rights 
The case briefly developed in this way: An Egyptian pharmacist, 32, Marwa el-Sherbini who 
was living in Germany since 2003, stood in a Dresden courtroom on 2 July 2009, testifying against 
a man charged with racially insulting her. Then the defendant went across the courtroom, and 
stabbed her with a knife, 18 times. As her husband, Eliv Ali Okaz, ran to her aid, he was shot by 
police who mistook him for the attacker.
9
  The assailant was a ―Russlanddeutschen‖, an immigrant 
who came to Germany to work, for the same reason that El-Sherbini came. He was ―more‖ 
German‖ than the El-Sherbini and her husband in the eyes of the police.  This is a typical ethnic-
genealogical citizenship practice that excludes the immigrant (a non-member of dominant ethnic 
group) not just from formal citizenship but also from equal treatment. Reactions to the murder case 
are diverse, but I will cite two examples which show how the ‗collective claims-making processes‘ 
are connected to the transnationally formed discourses and identities become particularistic and 
                                                 
9 Collins, R., Marwa el-Sherbini: Egypt's 'headscarf martyr' | News | The First Post. Available at: 
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/50410,news,marwa-el-sherbini-egypt-headscarf-martyr-germany-burka-okaz-racism-
sarkozy [Accessed July 26, 2009]. 
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expressive.  
First one surveys the reception of the case in Egypt and other Muslim countries and asks 
why the Muslims are silent regarding 'Hijab martyrs' within Muslim majority countries by arguing 
that El-Sherbini had won on her 'hate crime claim' and awarded damages because she had been 
called a ‗terrorist‘ while the cases in latter are mostly ignored by the judicial system.10 Second 
example is in a more direct connection with the human rights discourse that does not want to 
recognize the case in religious terms. Rather it considers the case as a matter of violent 
Islamophobia and racism and urges the readers to think the case not as religious conflict by saying 
that Marwa did not die because she was wearing a hijab, she died because a racist murderer killed 
her.
11
  What we see is a clear human rights discourse rather than a plea for a religious freedom, as 
Soysal would argue. However, the second part of Soysal's argument that identities become 
'particularistic and expressive' is problematic for the reason that the way the Islamic practice 
handled by the sociology of religion as a discipline has a particular historical formation process.  
An important reason that makes Soysal‘s argument problematic to apply for the ‗hijab‘ issue 
is that it would reduce the Hijab to a substantial symbol which is part of the sociological view of 
religion as essentially consisting of functional meanings. According to this view, which is inherited 
from French sociological and anthropological theory to the European social theory at large (Tarot 
1999, cited in Salvatore 2007), the social processes have symbolic dimensions without which our 
social sentiments cannot live.
12
 We frequently hear the secular argument that the Hijab is a symbol 
for political Islam and it creates pressure on ‗non-veiled‘ Muslim girls, therefore there is no place 
for religion in public sphere, that at the end justifies the ban on headscarves in public schools in 
France and Turkey.        
In the first part of the article, I cited Brubaker's claim of high naturalization rate in France 
                                                 
10 T.Uddin, A., altmuslim - Germany's Marwa el-Sherbini: The ―hijab martyrs‖ among us. Available at: 
http://www.altmuslim.com/a/a/a/3183/ [Accessed July 26, 2009]. 
 
11  Marwa El Sherbini Did Not Die For Her Hijab, So Please Stop Saying That She Did « Muslimah Media Watch. 
Available at: http://muslimahmediawatch.org/2009/07/23/marwa-el-sherbini-did-not-die-for-her-hijab-so-please-
stop-saying-that-she-did/ [Accessed July 26, 2009]. 
 
12  [...] without symbols, social sentiments could have only a precarious existence. (Durkheim 1912, p.231) 
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and said it doesn‘t imply expansion of rights of the migrants, now in ban on headscarve case, 
success in granting the political membership does imply the expansion of state's authority over the 
migrants. It was the fear of the loss of authority in the classroom that triggered the ban process. The 
legacy of French sociology (Durkheim and Mauss) on contemporary discussions of secularity and 
religious practice in liberal secular democracies ignores the question of who are the interpreter and 
his/her interaction with the head-scarf wearing woman. Whether an object has a symbolic meaning 
and what this meaning is depends not only on the context but also on the positioning of the 
interpreter and on the inherited power relations among the actors. (Salvatore 2007, p.148) 
Association of headscarf with the political Islam and ‗expressive identity‘ (and with the terrorism in 
El-Sherbini case by the assailant) but not with a faith by the anti-Hijab countries manifests strong 
will to restore the state authority in public schools. So it is the positioning of the state as pro-ban 
that foregrounds the view that headscarf is a symbol.  
 
The fundamental ways through which the sociology of religion have connected religious 
traditions to the public sphere emanate from the traumatic experience of religious conflict and 
religious wars in early modern Europe and the subsequent nationalist wars from the eighteenth 
century through to the Second World War. (Salvatore 2004, p.1020) Hence, the proposition that the 
headscarf is a symbol, very much similar to the 'expressive identity' narration, has its own historical 
formations and is not necessarily related with the Islamic tradition. Yet, the particular formations are 
mostly ignored in dealing with the Islamic practices in European context.   
To repeat the arguments so far, the works of Soysal and Benhabib show that   immigration and the 
development of political globalization (universal human rights, increasing discourse of cosmo-
political justice) has challenged the conventional forms of citizenship. We have observed that the 
phenomena of the disaggregation of citizenship (collective identity, privileges of political 
membership, social rights and benefits) which contends that the entitlement to rights is no longer 
dependent upon the status of citizenship to the extent that legal resident aliens have been 
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incorporated into human rights regimes, as well as being protected by supra- and sub-national 
legislations. (Benhabib 2002, p.459) While they are incorporated into human rights regime, the 
immigrants are denied or made difficult to access political membership.  
  Several questions arise as we are forced to think about the place of politics in the 
Muslim communities that reside in Europe permanently and yet politically ‗ineffective.‘ (I mean the 
legal permanent residents who do not have political rights; 'denizens') For instance, a recent study 
by the German Federal  Office for Migration and Refugees shows that it is only 45 percent of the 
Muslim population in Germany that have German citizenship.13 (Total number of Muslims in 
Germany is estimated at between 3.8 and 4.3 million.) One way to approach this problem is to look 
at different understandings of selfhood to show the social philosophy behind the concept of 
citizenship and the agency or the lack thereof among the Muslim communities. To do this, first, I 
will take Talal Asad's proposal on how to deal with Islam as an object of scholarly investigation to 
situate the migrant communities in their own socio-cultural context / ways of ‗meaning making 
processes‘ and then consider the concept of ‗modern responsible agency‘ from the perspective of 
citizenship in relation to the idea of selfhood in Islam.  
 
 III. ‘Islam as a Discursive Tradition’ 
In a seminal essay that he wrote in 1986, Asad criticized previous anthropological studies on 
Islam on the ground that they establish their foundations on the notion of a determinate social 
blueprint or on an idea of an integrated social totality in which social structure and religious 
ideology interact. (Asad 1986, p.14) Clifford Geertz, as one of the early anthropologists of Islam, 
has approached religion as essentially different from science and common sense, having the 
function of producing a distinctive set of dispositions and worldview among the followers. 
Accordingly, Geertz asserted that religion should be studied in two stages; first the analysis of the 
meanings which are embodied in symbols and in second stage these analyses should be linked to 
                                                 
13  A summary of the study is available at:  
 http://www.bamf.de/cln_092/nn_434132/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Sonstige/muslimisches-
leben-kurzfassung-englisch.html  
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the social structures and psychological processes. Asad, on the other hand, sees these stages as 
essentially one; religious symbols acquire their meaning and efficacy in real life through social and 
political means and processes in which power, in the form of coercion, discipline, institutions, and 
knowledge, is intricately involved. Geertz‘s approach was also criticized for its close links with the 
liberal demand that religion be separate from realms of real power and reason such as politics, law 
and science. (Anjum 2007, p.659-60)  
According to Asad, a coherent anthropology of Islam should start from the concept of a 
discursive tradition that connects itself to the founding texts of the Quran and Hadith. An Islamic 
discursive tradition is a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to the conceptions of the 
Islamic past and future. It is identified by its own rationality or styles of reasoning, expressed in its 
texts, history, and institutions. This is not to say that there is some rationality, logic, or philosophy 
essentially Islamic and thus incomprehensible to the outsiders, but that certain theoretical 
considerations and premises originating from the content and form of the foundational discourse 
come to designate the tradition, and so anyone willing to argue within the Islamic tradition, ought to 
start with them, even if only to argue against them. (Anjum 2007, p.662)  
  The importance of the idea of Islam as a discursive tradition for this paper is that it 
requires the researcher ‗to be in a narrative relation‘ with the Islamic tradition, ‗a relation that will 
vary according to whether one supports or opposes the tradition, or regards it as morally neutral.‘ 
(Asad 1986, p.17) Hence, I find it relevant to ask what it means to be (or not to be) a citizen for a 
Muslim immigrant in Europe. I will narrow the question down to the issue of understanding of 
selfhood in Islam. I don‘t see the phenomena of citizenship as only formal political membership in a 
state. It is more about how 'individuals' are connected or embedded into the social institutions. For 
instance, paying taxes, voting, developing career; attending schools, gaining professional trainings 
etc., these are the 'normal' practices for almost anybody in any part of the world. By incorporation 
into the social institutions, I mean the processes, the reasonings, the techniques that link us to these 
institutions. Promotion, or favoring and construction of a particular understanding of selfhood (in 
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modern statehood, it is the 'modern responsible agency' which also gives the fundamental thrust for 
the concept of citizenship) is maybe the most important link in these processes. It is through this 
link that   authority and power is kept in modern state. Citizenship as a whole entails all these 
processes. I claim that Islamic ethic of selfhood potentially keeps Muslims outside the modern 
formation of 'responsible agency.' So the link between institutions of the modern state and 
individual is mostly transformed, if not interrupted, by the Islamic notion of selfhood.  Now I will 
substantiate this argument. 
 
  IV. Modern Responsible Agency and Islamic Notion of Selfhood 
  Although these are two different concepts, it is not much a comparison to be 
followed here but more an attempt to read them together to have a closer view of how and why the 
Muslim immigrants in especially Western European countries do not have citizenship of their 'host' 
countries and how this situation should be approached if we want to understand the place of politics 
in Muslim migrant communities. To facilitate the discussion, I will benefit from the works of two 
figures to analyze these two broad concepts. First one is Jurgen Habermas‘ discussion of ‗free will‘ 
as representative of idea of ‗modern responsible agency‘, though he does not claim as such. His 
discussion of free will is important to show how the moral responsibility of modern agency is 
related to social institutions. Second name is Said Nursi (1877-1960), a Kurdish Islamic scholar of 
late Ottoman and early Republican Turkey era. His treatise on the self, an interpretation of verses in 
the Quran (33:72) will be the basis here to discuss the content and the location of selfhood in Islam.  
  Contemporary social science offers the concept of agency as modern manifestation 
of free will. Modern citizen is understood as having free will as it is necessary for attributing the 
‗responsibility‘ that agents ‗bear.‘ (Habermas 2007, p.15) Islamic concept of selfhood, on the other 
hand, is based on an indicative meaning, by having no meaning in itself; the 'I' in Islamic theology 
is a ‗hypothetical line, a thread, an insubstantial Alif*.‘ (Said Nursi 1996 [1928], p.560) It is given 
                                                 
* ‗Alif‘ is the first letter of Arabic alphabet; 'ا.' There is no clear definition of the letter. The form of the letter invokes   
meaning that selfhood carries in Islam; 'a hypothetical line.' 
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‗an imagined dominicality‘ to make it compare the ‗limitless dominicality‘ of God. Maybe we can 
call it as merely an instrument of comparison to situate the position of human self in the world. It 
should be noted that moral responsibility in Islam is not dependent on the self as an autonomous 
being while the modern selfhood is responsible for his / her actions for the very reason that s/he has 
a free will. I don‘t mean that there is not free will in Islam; the point is that 'human free will' is not 
connected to the self as tight as it is in modern selfhood. 
   A general proposal about the modern responsible agency is that ‗individuals‘ are 
‗morally responsible‘ for their actions since they have ‗free will.‘ Philosophically speaking, ―free 
will‖ is a term for a particular kind of capacity of rational agents to select a course of action from 
among diverse alternatives; most philosophers assume that the concept of free will is firmly related 
to the concept of moral responsibility. (O'Connor 2008) Habermas articulates ‗free will‘ as the 
mode of how one binds one’s own will on the basis of convincing reasons.’  Freedom of the will 
constitutes ‗a mode of being‘ in which agents exist within the space of reasons and are responsive to 
culturally transmitted and socially institutionalized reasons. (Habermas 2007, p.19) The axis of the 
self to become free is based on its responsiveness to the convincing reasons which are socially 
institutionalized. Binding one‘s own will through convincing reasons (or the issue of moral 
responsibility) is bound by the cultural and social context since the convincing reasons are produced 
within these contexts.
14
 By social and cultural context, I understand the formation of modern 
secular state in general and ‗nation-state‘ in particular that aims to create ‗loyalty‘ among its 
members. The power of modern state relies upon its ability to create commitments or belongings 
towards itself among citizens. Therefore, political membership (or formal citizenship) is closely 
related with the search of ‗evidence‘ for ‗loyalty‘ in the context of Muslim immigrants such as 
political obligation (military service etc.) in time of war in the host country.    
                                                 
14 The etymology of the word ‗binding‘ has interesting connections; the German word ‗binden´ (tying, committing 
oneself to someone) and Persian ‗benden‘ comes from same root, as both German and Persian were in the same 
language family (Indo-European) before they separated approximately five thousand years ago. Kurdish ‗bend‘ 
means slavery, captivity; Armenian ‗band‘ has a meaning of ‗prison‘ and ‗shackles.‘ Turkish ‗bendeniz‘ also means 
‗your slave or your subject.‘  Semantic proximity among different languages may imply different understanding of 
selfhood. (Nisanyan, Sevan. ―Bendeniz.‖  7 July 2009. Taraf. Daily News http://www.taraf.com.tr/makale/6447.htm)    
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 It is interesting to note that the discussions of ‗free will‘ that took place in history of 
philosophy for more than two thousand years are replaced by discussions on ‗agency‘ in social 
sciences, beginning in 1960s. On the usage of the concept ‗agency‘, Asad argues that; 
[…] 'agency‘ is now employed in the social sciences to attack many 
things—the use of statistical reasoning, the idea of historical forces, 
the force of habit, traditional oppressions—and to celebrate self-
empowerment history-making, and individualism. An ethnographic or 
historical account that lacks evidence of a people's 'agency' is held to 
be a faulty account. What underlie such judgements are the perceived 
opportunities and limitations of modernity. This notion of 'agency‘, I 
argue, presupposes a teleological history and an essentialised human 
subject. (Asad 2000, p. 29)            
 
 Is ‗modern responsible agency‘ an essentialised understanding of human subjectivity? It is, I argue, 
an essentialised subjectivity as long as the moral responsibility and ‗free will‘ is elevated to the 
status of a benchmark for political membership. It is essentialised subjectivity because it disregards 
the weaknesses that humans carry and totalizes particular aspects of selfhood. In comparison to 
modern responsible agency, Islamic discursive tradition approaches to human selfhood as merely a 
‗conscious strand from the thick rope of the human being, a fine thread from the raiment of the 
essence of humanity.
15
 (Said Nursi 1996 [1928], p.559-560) So here the human selfhood is just a 
part of human being unlike the modern autonomous responsible personhood which forms the kernel 
of human being. The implications of these two different understanding of human selfhood are 
crucial to illustrate the reconfigurations of rights and the emergence of ‗postnational citizenship‘ 
phenomena.  
  We can claim that the most important question that Islam poses regarding the content 
of liberal democratic citizenship is the idea of a modern responsible agency that is at odds with the 
                                                 
15 Demek ene, âyine-misal ve vahid-i kıyasî ve âlet-i inkişaf ve mânâ-yı harfî gibi, mânâsı kendinde olmayan ve 
başkasının mânâsını gösteren, vücud-u insaniyetin kalın ipinden şuurlu bir tel ve mahiyet-i beşeriyenin hullesinden 
ince bir ip ve şahsiyet-i Âdemiyetin kitabından bir elif‘tir ki […] (Said Nursi 1996 [1928], p.537) 
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concept of a normative Muslim selfhood. In the former, close connections between agency and state 
institutions support authority of the state to garner the legitimacy that state needs, while in the latter, 
there is an ontological positioning of the human self in the form of distancing one self from an 
authority other than God. I should remind that this highly simplified view of agency and normative 
Muslim selfhood operates within the confines of the everyday life practices. One can not 
necessarily infer from the agency discussion that modern citizen is a mere subject of the state and 
that modern citizenry is under the full control of the state (and market regulations.) Likewise, one 
can not conclude that Muslims are free of political subjection and / or authority of the state. 
  
  Maybe the most practical outcome of these two different self understandings is the 
treatment of the modern idea of the statehood with suspicion by the Muslim traditions. A good 
example that reflects this suspicion is the conflictual relations of the founders of Islamic 
jurisprudence with the rulers of their time. It could be claimed that the suspicion regarding the state 
affairs (I mean whether they are legitimate in terms of Islamic jurisprudence.) is a crucial part of the 
legal reasoning. Maybe the most prominent case in this respect is the Abū Ḥanīfah (the founder of 
Hanafiyya school of religious law) who was jailed due to his refusal of the government offer as 
Justice Minister to remain independent from the governmental intervention to the juridical 
processes. Armando Salvatore analyzes the ―reconstruction of Muslim traditions‖ which was 
observed in 19th century of the Egypt, India and Ottoman Empire and argues that the project of 
reform which was designed by the public intellectuals and governors reexamined the traditional 
forms of Islamic reasoning to promote education, collective welfare, economic development, and 
public morality. (Salvatore 2004, p.1016) The contention is that reconfiguration of Islamic 
reasoning / Muslim traditions via press, public discussions, sermons, coffee house circles did not 
turn the traditional norms of self, community and authority into modern model of personal 
responsibility and loyalty to the nation state. Islamic reform kept a high level of indeterminacy and 
distrust towards the secular modern state. (Asad 2003, p.205-56, cited in Salvatore 2004)  
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  Keeping in mind that the reform processes most of the time were held under the 
colonial occupation, I wonder whether we can transpose the ‗indeterminacy and distrust‘ that Asad 
and Salvatore mentions to contemporary Europe where a majority Muslims are reluctant towards 
participating in political institutions of the secular states and obtaining citizenship. Throughout the 
paper, I have mentioned two different dimensions of difficulties in obtaining citizenship; one is 
institutional difficulties that are mainly result of ethnic-genealogical citizenship tradition and 
Westphalian political imaginary, the other dimension is what I am focusing now: the lack of 
confidence in modern secular state.   
  For the moment, I don‘t have a satisfactory answer for the plausibility of the 
connections between these two phenomena, however, if we look at the resurgent interest by the 
political liberalism in Islamic affirmation of citizenship (or ―jurisprudence of Muslim minorities‖ 
discourse in general) within non-Muslim majority societies and clarify the role of ―jurisprudence of 
Muslim minorities‖ (‗Fiqh al- aqalliyyat‘ which deals with Muslim loyalty, citizenship and 
residence in non- Muslim majority countries) discourse in dispelling the distrust, we may find some 
continuities.  
  The idea of political liberalism, first of all, rests upon an assumption that the majority 
of the European citizens (regardless of their religious or political, sexual affiliations) are political 
liberals that are neutral towards other ‗comprehensive doctrines.‘ It is purely a doctrine of social 
and political cooperation that seeks to devise the most reasonable public conception of justice and 
citizenship for free and equal persons, given the existence of disagreement on the ultimate meaning 
of life and the epistemological foundation for exploring it. (March 2007b, p.401) In an article that 
aims to investigate the Islamic foundations for a social contract in non- Muslim liberal democracies, 
March argues that from a Rawlsian political liberalism perspective, the Islamic affirmation of 
citizenship is compatible with the political liberalism through the latter‘s potential to garner support 
from other comprehensive doctrines. The full justification to collect such support has been 
attributed to the political liberalism‘s abstinence from any claims of truth for its political values. 
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(March 2007a, p.236) Following the same line of thinking, March investigates the works of the 
contemporary Islamic literature on the ―jurisprudence of Muslim minorities‖ that attempt to provide 
an Islamic foundation for a relatively compact and multidimensional relationship of moral 
obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims. He considers this attempt as a form of a 
‘comprehensive qualitative’ perspective to ethics which goes beyond classical juridical reasoning 
that puts the Muslims in a limited doctrine of ‗loyal resident alienage.‘ (March 2009, p.92)   
  March‘s discussion of the encounter between Islamic ethic and the liberal is 
enlightening to see the limits of both the former and the latter in terms of their ‗political‘ 
imaginings. What strikes me most is, however, his indifference to historicity of the values that form 
the political and social boundaries of the political liberalism. Maybe the most important limit is the 
state-centric model of nations on which Rawlsian theory of liberal democratic justice is based and 
lack of consideration on the conditions of entry and exit into the political community. (Benhabib 
2002, p. 444-45) Another problem in reconciling political liberalism with the jurisprudence of 
Muslim minorities is the reduction of the issue of ‗moral obligation‘ to state into a predominantly 
secular character by which I mean the conflict between two different understandings of human 
subjectivities.  
   
 
Conclusion  
I have tried to show how the immigration changes the modern concept of citizenship 
by focusing on first the disconnection of traditional notions of rights that were aggregated by the 
Westphalian political imaginary and then with the help of an anthropological approach to Islam 
developed by Asad, I have compared the notion of modern responsible agency on which modern 
citizenship has been established and the notion of selfhood in Islam as understood by Said Nursi. I 
argued that these different notions of subjectivity are highly influential in determining the 
‗individual‘s appropriation of citizenship practices and delineating the boundaries of political 
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membership in modern secular state. One possible effect of this Muslim understanding of selfhood 
is distrust towards the modern secular state due to the particular nature of restructuring Muslim 
traditions in 19
th
 century. I view the attempts of political liberal interest in jurisprudence of Muslim 
minorities as an important component of a strategy of turning this distrust into confidence.   
  The problem of ‗legal resident alienage‘ needs to be solved immediately not just for a 
fair condition of political membership in ‗national‘ contexts but also for a fair formation of a 
European political space which already implies a further institutional attempt from Westphalian 
political imaginary. However, different understandings of selfhood which imply more than mere 
‗cognitive dissonances‘ exist and they need to be considered too. This consideration, I think, 
involves first of all thinking about limits of the political membership in a particular country. The 
question to be asked here is whether the country is willing to accept immigrants. (I mean 
'acceptance' not in the sense of immigrants' economic value.) Acceptance (of not a majority vs. 
minority state but 'a democratic state of multiple minorities‘) naturally brings pluralization and 
contestation of value issues. In the context of Muslim migrants, shifting value judgments is likely to 
occur in the so called dichotomous public / private field.  
  Second issue that needs to be considered for the problem of 'legal resident alienage' 
is to ask whether the concept of citizenship is an appropriate tool to attenuate the deficits of political 
membership in a liberal democratic society. Sociological reality shows that a postnational 
membership is far behind in meeting the justice demands of the immigrants. Different 
understandings of selfhood and persistence of Westphalian political imaginary reveals that 
citizenship may not be a sufficient instrument to 'incorporate' Muslim migrants into political 
processes and to 'make them feel' that they are also part of the country. An emerging Euro-Islamic 
public sphere in that sense have a lot of opportunities due to its relative immunity from state 
authority and its unregulated, polycentric character. It is here, in emerging Euro-Islamic public 
sphere, that we observe a breaking away from the Westphalian type of citizenship which does not 
provide equal opportunities for the 'members' of the societies. 'A proactive socio-political criticism' 
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within migrant communities, whose actors are mainly women and youth, against exclusionary 
practices of modern secular state, might be approached as harbinger of a making of new Europe 
whose boundaries is not constrained by the territoriality, ethnicity, and religion.  
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Part C 
A Digression on the Articulation of Minority Difference and 
Secularism in Turkey 
 
                                                         
                                                     
  
  
 If a secular state declares secularity as basic principle of its constitution, it is assumed that the state 
does not involve in religious affairs of its citizens. The issue of religious freedom may be taken as 
the crucial site to test how the state conceives secularity. By looking at Turkish experience of 
secularity, this part aims to show how it is problematic to claim to be secular on one side and 
regulating religious affairs on the other and how this conundrum effects articulation and treatment 
of religious difference. An analysis of this problematic is traced through the shift of focuses in the 
key words of religious and political discourses in order to characterize the ambiguous location of 
secularity in the popular imagination.   
  
 
 
  
 
 1. Can Secular State Provide Religious Freedom? 
  
 If we accept that all human beings are free to choose his/her religion in addition to having  
freedom to not to accept any belief system in any given society, then it ought to mean that we live in 
a society where religious differences are immune to state monitoring and control. One may object to 
the necessary relation between existence of religious freedom and state's refrainment from 
controlling the religion. Before arguing for the existence of the relationship between these two 
phenomenons, I want to analyze them separately.  First question comes to mind for the former is 
whether the religious freedom is possible in modern statehood. Secular legal regimes in many parts 
of the world guarantee the religious right of the persons or social groups. Granting the religious 
rights or protecting them is realized through the definition of what legally religion is in particular 
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country by the courts (or states in general). The definition attempt shows that courts are biased 
toward their own perspective of religions. This point is what Sullivan (2005) leads to believe: the 
impossibility of religious freedom. She offers ―forsaking the religious freedom as a legally enforced 
right‖ so that the religious individuals and communities could determine whether something is 
religious or not for themselves in a ―world of radical normative pluralism.‖ (2005, p.8)  
 
         Sullivan's argument on the impossibility of religious freedom is based on the state's heavy 
involvement in regulating the religious affairs through definition attempts (of determining what is 
legally religion and hence worthy of constitutional protection.)
16
 How and why does state control 
religion? There are several answers to this question, depending on the context and the time. Talal 
Asad's answer is similar to Sullivan‘s; he contends that it is not possible to separate religion off 
from state for the reason that 'the state has to define what essentially religion is in order to be able to 
protect it, especially if it has freedom of religion.' In other words, 'the state has to decide what is to 
be protected.' (Asad 2009) Obviously, religion is too difficult to define; even the religious 
individuals are in pain to define the borders of their faith, albeit for different reasons. If it is not a 
mere power struggle, the conflict or the tension between state and religious 'authorities' or 
individuals may be thought to be originated in the autonomy that the parties want to keep. The idea 
of 'autonomy' that I have in mind is a kind of 'autonomy' that does not call for an institutional or 
personal bid for power. I don't want to simplify the idea by stressing the celestial aspects of it. To 
avoid the state centric perspective to freedom of religion, one may resort to religious discourse 
regarding the issue in Islam. In the context of Turkish Islam (if it is possible to claim the existence  
of such distinct version of Islam!), it is very interesting to note that while the state claims to be the 
protector of the religious values of its citizens, no religious figure would dare to argue in this line of 
thinking. Rather, the concerns and efforts of the religious figures have concentrated upon clarifying 
                                                 
16  ―Courts need some way of deciding what counts as religion if they are to enforce these laws. Is it possible to do this 
without setting up a legal hierarchy of religious orthodoxy? And who is legally and constitutionally qualified to 
make such judgments? Can 'lived religion' ever be protected by laws guaranteeing religious freedom?‖ (Sullivan,  
2005, p.3) 
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and explaining the notions, practices and implementations of religious values. Indeed, it is possible 
to expand this claim in other Muslim geographies too. In other words, secular logic of guaranteeing 
the freedom of religion of the citizens are embedded in a paternalistic mode of prohibiting the 
religious duties of the persons or groups, as it is heavily observed in the example of Turkey and 
France. (Salvatore 2007, p.147) I will try to elaborate on how this paternalistic protectionism 
gradually is manifested through changing perception of state and religion in popular daily 
discourse.     
  
 2. 'Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism’: Interpenetration or Incursion? 
 
[…] the specifics of Turkish history have endowed the Ottomans and the 
Turkish Republic with characteristics that have worked cumulatively to 
create a special setting for Islam, a setting where secularism and Islam 
interpenetrate, which of course is quite different from saying that Islam and 
secularism have fused. This interpenetration or overlap is the real 
methodological obstacle that faces the investigator of Islamic modernism in 
Turkey. (Mardin 2005, p.148) 
  
 To repeat the central argument of this part, I claim that if state accepts in its constitution the 
religious freedom of its citizens, then it ought to mean that state does not involve in religious affairs 
of its citizens in under any circumstances. In this sense, Turkish case presents many contradictions 
that need to be expressed in problems regarding the religious freedom. An obvious problem starts 
with the constitution. In the article two of the constitution, it says 'the Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law.' Article twenty four, however, 
states that 'Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control.' The contradiction continues; 'Instruction in religious culture and moral 
education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools.'  
 
 Claims to be secular on one side and controlling the religious education of citizens on the 
other is clearly not an oxymoron in the perception of state authorities, rather it is the manifestation 
of an idea that took shape since late 18th century, in that the interest of the state precedes all other 
things; law, society, religion etc., under the guidance of reformation process, triggered by the 
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Westernizing the statehood by the Ottomans in the face of defeats and decadence and massive 
socio-political transformation by the subsequent Turkish Republic. Maybe the most important 
concept that shows how this idea (basically the primacy of state with its all civil bureaucratic and 
military elites) have attempted to shape the society is the change from 'Nizam-ı Alem' to 'Nizam-ı 
Cedid.'
17
 Now I will focus on these two concepts that we frequently find in the discourse of political 
and religious figures. The first concept has different meanings; however, here it is used as it was 
meant by the Ottoman Ulema (this meaning was also shared by the Ottomans in general); 'social 
world' (or the order of the social world). Before late 18th century, social world (including the 
political and economical dimensions) was one and the same with the religion (Islam.) The order of 
this social world had been formed by the Sharia. When the predicament of the society changes, the 
needs or the answers would be searched within the religion. (Görgün 2000, p. 184-88) This view 
has been gradually replaced by the concept of Nizam-ı Cedid in which the new order toppled the 
authority of religion from society and state. It seems that the secular has invaded the religious 
perception of social reality rather than mutually influencing each other when it comes religious 
freedom.  
 
 The shift of focus (or 'change of axis') is important here in order to show that there is a direct 
relationship between secular regimes and strict monitoring of religion. The dominance of the 
concept 'Nizam-ı Alem' reflects the force of the religion both as almost independent institution and 
as a living social reality in especially early Ottoman Empire that gave birth to the 'Millet system' 
with its all debilities. Nizam-ı Cedid, on the other hand, reflects the power of the state as fulcrum of        
the organization of the social. The latter concept also defines what the Republic represents; modern, 
national, and secular. The desire to control the religion in society is sine qua non of the secular 
                                                 
17  It is interesting to note that the meaning of these concepts in contemporary everyday Turkish has a very nationalist 
sense; political conquest of the world by the state, in other words, the order (nizam) of the world (alem) is realized 
through state. So state here (in contemporary usage) is the main agent. Ironically, the name of a youth political 
organization which functions as  a sub-unit of a nationalist party was  'Nizam-ı Alem Ocakları.'  
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regime. Because, the secular has another face in modern Turkish context; nation-state. It is the 
organic relation between the secular and the national that makes the religious freedom impossible. 
For instance, the reason which was given in an official declaration on closing the Heybeliada Greek 
Orthodox Religious School (Halki Seminary) was Greek intolerance against Turkish minorities in 
Greece. This retaliatory logic of governing the religious diversity is typical response of a nation-
state. Here the issue is not whether the Turkish minority is treated equal. A secular nation-state has 
to look for correspondency in its policies with the 'foreign' nationals and religions. When the control 
is not possible, the secular uses all its power to ban or to limit the religious practice.  This 
inclination towards the control in statehood is so internalized in daily common sense that we 
frequently hear the saying ―Of course, this is what it needs to be done, no state would allow such  
unamenable acts.‖ I may safely claim that the intricate relation between secular logic and the 
nation-state makes the religious freedom impossible. On the other hand, we observe that the issue of 
religious freedom was a problematic one in the history of Muslim societies too. Next paragraphs 
will not examine the problem of religious freedom in the history, rather they will deal with the 
meanings (and the concepts) attached to 'religious minorities' in history of a Muslim society.     
  
 3. 'Azınlık', ' Dh̲immī  and 'Muahid': The positioning of non-Muslim in a 'Muslim 
Majority' Country 
   
 First important point that needs to be stated is that the Islamic words ( Dh̲immī  and 
'Muahid) for the 'minority' does not invoke any mathematical majority (or numerical superiority) or 
otherwise, instead, the words are oriented towards a party and his/her rights in a covenant. Current 
Turkish word for minority (azınlık), however, carries the meaning that the English word 'minority' 
carries. According to Bulaç (2010), the semantic differences between these three words do not just 
prove the existence of various implementations based on different historical conditions, but the 
words elicit a problem that has been mostly overlooked. He offers a contractionist argument in that 
the non-Muslim (including the non-believer and follower of non-Abrahamic religions) can not be 
evaluated in the category of minority as long as s/he lives with the Muslims in peaceful terms. I will 
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not go into the details of stipulations in the contract or the related terms within the Islamic 
jurisprudence. What is worthy of discussion in the offer of Bulaç in terms of this paper is that if a 
contract is made between the Muslim and the non-Muslim community in the absence of war or 
conflict, both members of the parties are treated equal. This kind of contract is called 'muahide' and 
is different from Dhimma since here there is no hierarchical situation between parties (as in the 
instances of high taxes and fettering of high administrative posts within the Dhimmis of Muslim 
majority countries.)  
 
 The reason ('illet') that makes the contraction possible is the lack of 'aggressiveness' and 'bad 
intention'. Dhimma is valid only if it is the issue of war and conflict. The basis of treatment here is 
based on war, so the conditions are accordingly severe and are on the behalf Muslims. Another 
reasoning that Bulac reminds is that in Islamic law a person can not be hold responsible for 
something that s/he didn't commit. Thus, when a contract is made, it should be renewed or re-
examined as the time and the parties change. The Dhimmi status of a non-Muslim is not eternal, so 
if s/he is not in war with Islam, then the status should be shifted to equal rights with the Muslims or 
to whatever conditions is set up in the contract between the parties. 
 
  
            Conclusion 
  
 A secular constitution is not able to provide a solution for the problem of religious pluralism 
by which I mean the impossibility of impartiality and the favoring one religion on another by the 
state (for the reasons that I have tried to explain above) and when we look at the Muslim 
constructions of the difference (in terms of dealing with the non-Muslims), we also see problems in 
practice. From contemporary point of view, the secular epistemology is the hegemonical tool in the 
hands of governments. Solution to the problem of religious problem may be thought to be lying in 
the Sullivan's suggestion which gives up religious freedom as legally enforced right.  Along with 
the reconsideration of secular epistemology, a re-examination of religious construction of 
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differences and rights is needed to respond the religious diversity in modern city. In that sense, 
Bulaç's contractionist reading of Prophet's first nine years in Medina (after migration) is not only a 
critical evaluation of historical concepts such as Dhimmi, but also from a present perspective, is 
elicitation of other possibilities to uproot the conventional construction of religious difference. 
However, there is a serious obstacle in front of this attempt; it is unsurprisingly the nation-state, not 
religion.  
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Part D  
 ‗Euro-Islamic‘ Public Sphere  
 
 
To what extent can we talk about an emergence of Euro-Islamic public sphere? Considering 
the difficulties that surround the formation of a secular one, what makes the emergence of a Euro-
Islamic public sphere possible? In this part, first I will briefly write about the theory of public 
sphere designed by Jurgen Habermas and then common criticisms directed toward the theory, 
secondly I review the perspectives of a transnational Islamic public sphere in the continent. Third 
section considers the classical dichotomies of the private / public distinction and how it relates to 
the secularization process. Fourth section looks at some of the concepts in the field of Islamic legal 
theory in the context of Europe. Finally, I try to situate the possible tensions within the discussions 
of the Euro-Islamic public sphere. 
 
 I. Habermasian Public Sphere: Introductory Remarks 
As a concept, ‗the public sphere‘ means a dimension of our social life in which 
public opinion can be formed, whose accessibility is open to everyone and a field that mediates 
between state and society. Citizens act as public body when they negotiate the general interest in an 
‘unrestricted fashion’ mostly through communication technologies. There is close connection 
between state authority and the public sphere. The latter has an influence on former only if the 
political control is subordinated to the democratic demand that the information is to be public. 
Historically speaking, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is  the account of the rise 
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and decline of a ‗liberal model of the public sphere that emerged in 18th century‘ in which the 
activity of the state was to be monitored and directed by the informed, critical, public discourse of 
the governed. The public sphere in the 20
th
 century‘s social welfare state mass democracy, however, 
lost its social exclusivity and coherence which hitherto supported by the bourgeoisie society; private 
interests intrude into public sphere, law making does not come from consensus of private 
individuals engaged in public discussion. (Habermas 1974[1964], p.49-55) The consequent 
interlinking of state and society in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries implied the end of the 
liberal public sphere. (McCarthy 2009) According to Calhoun, the basic question leading Habermas' 
exploration of the public sphere was: to what extent can the wills or opinions guiding political 
action be formed on the basis of rational-critical discourse? (Calhoun 2002) Rational- critical 
discourse here is based on public reasoning on the common good, being free from the constraints of 
a political authority. On the relationship between public sphere and civil society, Calhoun claims 
that public sphere is a dimension of a civil society in which the main focuses are the organization of 
social life on the basis of interpersonal relationships, group formation, and systems of exchange 
linking people beyond the range of intimate family relations and without reliance on direction by 
the government. (Calhoun 2002)  
There are various critics of Habermasian public sphere that are accumulated till 
today; however, I will only focus on Nancy Fraser‘s two key articles (1990, 2007) on the theory. By 
presuming that the general idea of public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and 
democratic political practice in her first article, she argues that the public sphere theory should go 
through critical reconstruction and interrogation if it is to result in a category capable of projecting 
the limits of actually existing late capitalist democracy. (Fraser 1990, p.58) Her main departure 
point is that Habermas is indifferent towards the post- bourgeoisie society, that it needs to be read 
carefully through a revisionist historiography that points gender exclusions, the complex 
relationships between publicity and status, multiplicity of alternative and competing public spheres.  
She analyses the four assumptions on which the Habermasian public sphere was 
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formed. The first assumption is that it is possible for members to ignore (‗bracket‘) the status 
differentials, supposedly they are social equals in deliberation process. Accordingly, social equality 
is not a precondition for political democracy. This assumption hinders the participatory parity. 
Second assumption is that the flourishing of multiplicity of public spheres necessarily takes us away 
from the greater democracy; a single and comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to the 
networks of various public spheres. On the contrary, Fraser argues, in stratified societies the 
existence of plural competing public spheres foster a better ideal participatory democracy than does 
the single, unified public sphere. This is due to the difficulty of isolating the discursive arenas from 
social inequalities in which citizens are embedded. Third assumption is that the discourse in public 
spheres should be constrained with the common good; the private interests should not intrude into 
public sphere. This assumption inherits a problem from civic republicanism which wrongly 
combines the ideas of deliberation and common good as if deliberation must be deliberation about 
the common good. Therefore, it frames the deliberation in an ‗all-encompassing we‘ that reflects the 
ruling claims of self-interest and that at the end militates against the principle aims of the 
deliberation. Fourth and last assumption is that a functioning public sphere needs the separation of 
civil society and the state. Bourgeois conception of public sphere precludes state from civil society, 
which is to promote weak publics for the reason that weak publics are only for the formation of 
public opinion, not for the decision-making. Otherwise the public authority would become the state 
by losing its discursive critical role of checking the state actions. Strong publics (parliamentary 
sovereignty) is, on the other hand, blurs the separation of civil society and state. They are ‗internal 
public spheres‘ within the state. The problem is how to hold strong public accountable to the weak 
public. (Fraser 1990, p.62-76) 
In the second article which discusses transnational aspect of the public sphere in 
post-Westphalian world, Fraser asks whether we can apply the notions of normative legitimacy and 
political efficacy with which the idea of a publicity is achieved, that is to scrutinize the policies of 
the state and to hold the state officials accountable for their actions and to secure that the state 
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express the will of the citizenry, to the emerging transnational public spheres in which the 
interlocutors are not affiliated with the sovereign power. (Fraser 2007, p.7-8) In the first article, I 
have summarized Fraser‘s analyses of the bourgeoisie assumptions of the Habermasian public 
sphere; in the second paper she explicates the Westphalian underpinnings of Habermasian public 
sphere to reformulate the critical theory of the public sphere in a transnational framework.  
Identification of the public with the citizenry of territorial state, national economy 
and media imply the Westphalian political prospect of a public sphere theory. Considering the 
current condition of public opinion that denudes the Westphalian frame, Fraser inquires that; 
[…] many students of transnational publicity neglect to pose the 
questions of greatest importance for a critical theory: if public opinion 
now overflows the Westphalian frame, what becomes of its critical 
function of checking domination and democratizing governance? 
More specifically, can we still meaningfully interrogate the legitimacy 
of public opinion when the interlocutors do not constitute a demos or 
political citizenry? And what could legitimacy mean in such a 
context? Likewise, can we still meaningfully interrogate the efficacy 
of public opinion when it is not addressed to a sovereign state that is 
capable in principle of regulating its territory and solving its citizens‘ 
problems in the public interest? And what could efficacy mean in this 
situation? (Fraser 2007, p. 15)  
 
  It is interesting to read that Fraser thinks demos or political citizenry as the source of 
legitimacy in a discussion of the transnational publicity. If 'demos' is losing the ground, what could 
be the other source(s) for legitimacy? Noting that Fraser herself does not give a clear answer 
regarding the above questions, I should state that I am not primarily interested in the legitimacy of 
the public opinion in a transnational frame for the reason that the legitimacy significantly pertains to 
the changing citizenship practices and emergence of postnational citizenship phenomena that I have 
tried to focus in the previous chapter, however the political efficacy of public opinion is crucial for 
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the purpose of the this section.
18
 To a first approximation, we can claim that the political efficacy 
should not be thought in a direct relationship with the state policies in terms of transforming them 
since the terrain that the transnational public sphere occupies is not the institutional structure of the 
state. In the context of an Islamic transnational public sphere, political efficacy remains issue-
dependent, due to the multiplicity, informality and vulnerability of funding patterns, legal 
supervision and political mobilization. (Salvatore 2007, p.51)  
  One of the concerns of this part is to try to understand how the Muslim migrant           
communities could possibly influence making of a New Europe. The place of politics in this process 
is an equal concern as the 'modern' understanding of politics puts religion out of the public realm. I 
take politics as a modern system of category that constitutes a dimension of social life (a substantial 
dimension indeed), in that sense, using the term 'political Islam' is problematic since a lot of 
concepts that are used to elicit the place of religion in modern politics are irrelevant constructions 
that barely touches Islam. Studies on 'political Islam', for instance, are mostly investigations of 
myriad reactions against post colonial condition both in Euro-American and Muslim societies. 
When it comes to the issue of Islam and politics, one frequently hears the argument that establishing 
an original Islamic theocratic state is the real cause of contemporary 'Islamist ambitions'. Should we 
see 'Islamist political movements' or the emerging Euro-Islamic public sphere as manifestation of a 
will to form a theocratic state?   My position on the issue of Islam and politics is that Islam is not a 
political religion in the sense that it does not aim to establish a state. It is rather 'modernity and 
modernizing state' that has created ambitious Islamist politics. On the emergence of the idea that 
Islam and politics are mixed, Asad argues that; 
Western Orientalists, as well as Muslims who call for the 
establishment of an Islamic state, have taken for granted that the rise 
of Islam in the seventh century saw the establishment of a theocratic 
                                                 
18  The issue of legitimacy and political membership in classical public sphere cannot be directly transferred to the 
transnational public sphere. Partly because even in the former, the implicit assumption that citizenship established 
the sufficient bonds for the inclusiveness was problematic. We have observed this problematic in the changing forms 
of citizenship.  
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state in Arabia, one in which religion and politics were indissolubly 
fused together. For Islamists and Orientalists later Muslim history is 
seen as a falling away from that model, a process in which a 
separation occurred between religious and political institutions. For 
Islamists this separation constitutes the betrayal of a sacred ideal that 
Muslims are required as believers to restore: for Orientalists the 
lingering connection defines a schizophrenic compromise that has 
always prevented a progressive reform of Islam. (Asad 2006)   
   
  Moreover, Asad continues to claim that the idea to establish a theocratic Islamic state 
is the legacy of 19
th
 century European historiography that anachronistically applied modern 
categories of power and politics to understand the emergence of Islam in 7
th
 century. If we put aside 
the zealotry of contemporary 'Islamist ambitions', how should we understand the current role of 
Islam and Muslims in formation of European societies?       
  In other words, how to construe the condition of contemporary Muslim communities 
in Europe in terms of political efficacy? It has become clear that, whereas the 'public sphere' as the 
end result of a series of developments is largely modern, European, Western, and Westphalian, 'the 
normative character of its communicative function, the underlying idea of social connectivity and 
the public use of reason and argument are not necessarily so'. (Salvatore 2007, p.49) So how is the 
public use of reason in Islam? Now I will elaborate on these characters of a Euro Islamic public 
sphere.   
   
  II. Perspectives for a Transnational Euro-Islamic Public Sphere: Possibilities for 
Communication and Politics, Beyond Migration Discourse? 
  I view the discussions of Euro-Islamic public sphere and transnational Islam as two 
elements that complete each other. The phenomenon of a transnational Islam precedes the former 
one. How can we theorize about the transnational Islam? Grillo offers three kinds of formulations 
based on papers published in a special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. An Islam 
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within transnational circuits (a); mainly male circulatory transnationals from West Africa who work 
in Italy and France temporarily, though in a long term basis, organized in religious cells in the 
countries of emigration, the orders provide devotees with a moral framework empowered by the 
praised visits by the religious 'superstars ' from West Africa. Islam within a bi-national / 
plurinational framework (b); Mourid and Tijaniyya orders are international (situated in many 
countries), and transnational, following migrants' transnational circuits and linking up diasporas, 
their followers are therefore oriented to relationships across transnational space. But they are not 
post-national. Those living and working abroad are also confined (legally, economically, politically) 
by the circumstances of two nation-states: where they reside (Italy and France) and whence they 
came (`there', Senegal, Mali, Mauritania). Their orientation is hence `bi-national' or `plurinational' 
(Salih 2003, cited in Grillo 2004), towards two or more nation-states. Last form of transnational 
Islam that Grillo characterizes is Umma in which a transnational Islam manifests itself through an 
orientation not towards a particular migration circuit or diaspora, but towards the imagined 
community of Muslims at large either within one society or across many. (Grillo 2004, p.865-66) 
   Insufficiency of migration studies in revealing the underpinnings of an Islam in 
Europe has led to an increasing focus on political activism and communication by and among the 
Muslims on European level. In that sense John Bowen, reminding the necessity of rethinking the 
importance of the concept 'Umma', argues that the focus on the demographic movements and 
transnational institutions has obscured the importance of the field of Islamic reference and debate. 
(Bowen 2004, p.880) Emergence and the development of debates and discussions among Muslims 
about the nature and role of Islam in Europe have given rise to the creation of networks, 
conferences, and increasingly formalised institutions for systematic reflection among scholars. 
These activities and institutions stresses the quandaries experienced by Muslims attempting to 
develop forms of Islamic life 'compatible with' the range of Western norms, values and laws. (Grillo 
2001, cited in Bowen 2004, p.882) Migration and Islamic religious movements have played a clear 
and enduring role in establishing a Muslim presence in Europe. Islam's transnational public space in 
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that regard is `beyond migration', however, in that it is dependent neither on specific migration 
patterns nor on the activities of particularistic transnational movements. This space has lived since 
the beginning of the Islamic era, and long before it reached to Europe it regularly defined and 
created debates and references among scholars and public figures from Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt 
and elsewhere.  
  Both three kinds of formulations that Grillo described and Bowen's focus on Umma 
are far behind in articulating the complex identity formation in European context. Salih investigates 
the unease that some young Muslims feel about the dichotomous constructions which mark the 
debate on Muslim identities in both the academic and political arena (between difference; cultural 
or religious and universalism), and argues that ―Muslims' experience in the West is inscribed in, and 
cross-cuts, diverse socio-political identities, challenging the presumed dichotomy which opposes 
universalism to difference.‖ (Salih 2004, p.995) Yet, far from simple practices of 'bricolage', these 
processes of identity renegotiation are deeply 'painful and conflictual.' Based on the accounts of a 
young Moroccan informant, named Said, from Italian Muslim community, Salih comes up with the 
observation that 'neo-communities' that second and third generation Muslims form reflects the 
constitution of a mobilization that   provides them with a way out of the conundrum of selecting 
between ethnicity or integration,  adaptation or innovation.
19
 (Khilani 2002, cited in Salih 2004) 
                                                 
19  The term neo-communities belongs to Stefano Allievi (2003) who has been one of first sociologists of Islam in 
Europe. He asserts that term is different from the usual concept 'community.';    
  […] Islamic neo-communities of Europe differs from the communities of origin in many 
ways. Trying to resume a complex process of change in one concept, these neo communities, 
particularly the moment in which the second generation appears and starts to active at the social level, 
are religious (religious) precisely because they are no longer ethnic or national (for instance they start 
to be open to different ethnic national origins). On the other hand, they are open to the influence of 
these same ethnic and national origins, and also have an influence over them in a process of reciprocal 
interaction. (p.4) 
 
 Allievi, S. & Nielsen, J.S., 2003. Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, Brill 
Academic Publishers   
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Furthermore, this new sociality helps them to overcome the trap of `minority standpoint', and to 
express the 'Islamic identity' with universal values, rather than just claiming respect for `difference'. 
(Salih 2004, p.1009) How does this new sociality realize in everyday life?  Salih observes that;                                                                                                                                                                         
[…] the political, social and civil engagement with the local society in 
Europe is a path that, although involving a high level of compromise 
and risk of refusal, is the only one which opens up the possibility for a 
new and truly plural society. Said's voice, while marginalised at the 
national level, seems to find strong legitimacy and echo in the 
thoughts expressed by European Muslim intellectuals who are at the 
forefront of promoting the ideas and practices of a Euro-Islam, not 
detached from, but anchored in, the reality of the Muslim world. (Salih 
2004, p.1009) 
  One of the ways in this new sociality is manifested through the intergenerational 
conflicts: Islam of the parents versus the Islam of their children. Mandaville notes a shift in the 
locus of leadership within Muslim communities in Europe, particularly as pertaining the question of 
where the current generation is looking to find new ideas and new interpretations of Islam that are 
tuned with the day-to-day realities of European life. He claims that young Muslims have been 
turning increasingly to thinkers and writers who stress a more universalist interpretation of the 
religion. This interpretation is mostly in contrast to the Islam of their parents which they often view 
as rather ‗local‘ and loaded with sectarian or ethnic overtones. The new stream of Muslim 
intellectual refuses the dogmatism of centuries old and seeks instead to engage critically with the 
traditions and prescriptions of Islam. Furthermore, these figures— highly sensitive to the specific 
issues encountered by Muslims in Europe— suggests a creative vision that urges their audience to 
view life in the West as a condition that allows Islam to grow, in that sense an active participation 
and engagement with the wider society is encouraged. (Mandeville 2002, p.140)  
 The question of isolationism is one of these intergenerational conflicts. While particularly 
young European Muslims actively pursuing today to establish a place for themselves mainstream 
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society, the apparent ambivalence of their parents in this regard is a keen source of dissatisfaction. 
When it comes to religion, watching their parents‘ generation participate in endless and seemingly 
'trivial' debates about proper prayer technique did nothing but estrange younger Muslims. They 
wanted an Islam that had something to say, for instance, about how properly to live one‘s life in a 
non-Muslim society and the particular challenges presented by those situations. Mosque leaderships 
inclined to be of the older generation and, again, representative of ‗local‘ Islam from the villages of 
South Asia or North Africa. Many religious organizations would even ‗import‘ imams and 'ulamà 
from Pakistan and Bangladesh for regular tours of duty— thus preventing the first generation of 
Muslim immigrants from ever leaving the relative safety of Islam in the homeland. Young Muslims 
often thought this religious leadership to be particularly dogmatic and narrow minded in its 
understanding of Islam. Questions and challenges in the mosque were not countenanced and the 
younger generation grew increasingly frustrated at being told, when questioning certain aspects of 
Islam, ‗that‘s just the way it is‘. It is therefore not a coincidence that the current generation of young 
Muslims in Europe has turned away from traditional sources of religious leadership and authority. 
Most of this younger generation is highly educated and seeking a more sophisticated idiom of 
Islam. Intellectually they have tended towards major figures within the wider Muslim world such 
as, initially, Abu Ala Mawdudi and Fazlur Rahman, and today writers such as Abdolkarim Soroush 
in Iran, Malaysia‘s Chandra Muzaffar, and the Qatar-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. 
Simultaneously, there has emerged within Europe itself a new breed of Muslim leadership, often 
concentrated on highly educated, relatively young, professionals and intellectuals. (Mandeville 
2002, p.134-5)  
  We see a similar line of thinking in Salvatore who expands the vision of Salih by 
claiming that while until recently Muslim thinkers in Europe have been at the inter- face between 
transnational Islamic discussions and specifically European problems regarding the distinctive 
characteristics of an emerging ‗Euro-Islam‘ (Mandaville 2003: 127–29, cited in Salvatore 2007), the 
debates (regarding headscarve and Islamic religious practices in 'public spaces') manifest  the  
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implications of a trend that blurs the borders between Muslim and non-Muslim voices in Europe, 
and between problems of European and of transnational Islam. By Euro-Islam, he means not a 
Europeanized Islam to be shaped through appropriate measures by the political authorities and the 
good will of European Muslims, but, increasingly, 'as a constitutive dimension of European public 
spheres and their discursive formations, cutting through various national publics and at some crucial 
junctures unifying them into one single Euro-Islamic sphere. ‗(Salvatore 2007, p.137)  
  As Salih and Salvatore point out the national context in which Muslims are settled 
could not be a venue for a social and civic activism that they need, due to the narrow imaginings of 
a particular ethnic and traditional identity. In that respect, there is a growing trend within many 
young Muslims in Europe to go beyond the limits of national boundaries in their networking 
practices. The lived experience of being Muslim in Europe is one of negotiating plural affiliations 
and allegiances to multiple traditions as – 'an endeavour that is compatible with the European ideal 
of a citizenry grounded less in territorial identity, but committed instead to a wider normative 
vision.' Maybe one of the most important institutions that reflect these multiple affiliations and 
allegiances is the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), 
founded in 1996 to offer a social context in which several national Muslim youth organizations can 
get together to talk and act on matters of common interest. The Forum has in recent years 
established itself as a credible voice and resource for the next generation of European Muslims, and 
has formed important links with institutions such as the European Parliament.                                                           
  One of its priorities among many is `the development of a European Muslim Identity, 
via the involvement of Muslim youth in discussions, educational and awareness programmes, 
highlighting social responsibilities and contribution to Europe'. The description of the organisations` 
aims states 'how with over 25 million Muslims present in East and West Europe, there is a desperate 
need for Muslims across Europe to have a voice within the European structures and also to meet to 
co-ordinate and co-operate. ' (femyso.org) A similar trend is visible in Spain where a group of 
young Muslims which organized themselves outside the existing Muslim associations after the 
 45 
Madrid Bombings. (Delgado 2008, p. 38) Until now one of the key challenges encountering the 
generational transition within European Islam has been the problem of a successful leave from the 
'legal resident alienage' and ‗ghettoization‘ that characterized the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants to a culture of public engagement and political participation on the part today‘s young 
European Muslims, groups such as FEMYSO and FIOE (Federation of Islamic Organizations in 
Europe) show some important routes towards the practical realization of something like a 
‗European Islam‘. (Mandaville 2003, p.35)   
             The important facet of this European Islam that Muslims today address  rereading 
and reassessing the textual sources of Islam in new contexts. In this regard there would emerge to 
be some degree of discursive overlap between these new intellectual trends and recent thinking in 
Western critical theory as we have seen between liberalism and Islam. The notion of dialogue and 
some form of ‗communicative action,‘ to invoke Habermas, within a public sphere seem to be 
intrinsic to both. (Mandeville 2002, p.153) Figures such as Tariq Ramadan, in his creative readings 
of the core sources of Islamic law, have begun the crucial process of developing the contours of 
what might be called a ‗minority jurisprudence designed specifically for Muslim living in situations 
in which they are not a majority. The difficulty, as Ramadan sees it, is to find a way for Muslims to 
protect and uphold the core of their religion without resorting to isolationism; to participate, in other 
words, without diluting the essential meanings of Islam.  
  ‗To promote and to advocate such involvement in Western society is not only new, 
and thus difficult,‘ he says, ‗but also necessitates that some sensitive legal questions and ethical 
issues receive, as essential prerequisites, clear answers and solutions‘ (Ramadan, 1999, 102). Many 
Muslims in Europe who are part of this new trend see themselves as playing a role within the 
context of a much wider picture. ‗Muslims in Europe have a more global sense of Islam,‘ says one 
religious scholar, ‗and hence have a role to play in the global isation of the religion‘ (Barkatullah, 
1998 cited in Mandeville 2002). Europe gives a context for the reassessment of theories, beliefs and 
traditions, while increased transnationalism allows these new rearticulations to spread around the 
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world. For some Muslims this suggests the greatest hope for rethinking Islam: In order to have 
ijtihàd [independent judgement] you need 'freedom of thought.' This does not exist in most Muslim 
countries. 'We Muslims in the West should debate, discuss and disseminate our ideas because this 
will encourage Muslims living where there is not freedom to do the same, or at least to make use of 
the materials and ideas we produce'. (Siddiqui 1998, cited in Mandeville 2002). On the issue of how 
communication technologies are used by the Muslims, Mandeville writes: 
We can meaningfully speak today about the existence of something 
like a global infrastructure for the maintenance, reproduction and 
dissemination of Islam. This ‗regime‘ possesses no central authority 
and there is very little co-ordination between its various constitutive 
elements. Nevertheless, through a diverse range of organisations, 
technologies and transnational structures the contours of a 
transnational Islam are beginning to emerge. We have already 
mentioned several of the institutions which collectively form this 
infrastructure such as the ‗imported imams‘ who travel back and forth 
between homeland and diaspora, and the myriad regional and 
transregional Muslim organisations which mediate daily life for 
believers in a variety of national settings. In addition, we can also 
point to the role played by various communication and information 
technologies, from the circulation of a wide range of English-language 
books on Islam via international publishing networks linking 
Washington, D.C. with Durban, London and Karachi (Metcalf, 1996, 
xv), to cyberspace debates between Muslims of various madhàhib in 
Internet chat rooms. Diaspora television programmes also play a role 
in the sustenance of long distance communal and religious ties 
(Naficy, 1993), as does the live broadcast of the hajj in many Muslim 
countries and its subsequent availability on video (Metcalf, 1996, 11). 
Migratory spaces and global cities also heavily in transnational Islam. 
With their culturally diverse and highly mobile populations, cities 
such as London are important nodal points for networks of discourse 
and often serve as factories for the production and import/ export of 
(reformulated) ideology. (Mandeville 2002, p.153) 
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  II. Boundaries: Secularizing the Public 
  Thinking about a transnational, Euro-Islamic public sphere would bring us a 
relativized view of conventional norms that regulate secular nation state. Maybe the first among the 
conventional norms are the famous private / public dichotomies that reflect the organization of 
modern state. Entry on the private / public dichotomy at the Blackwell Dictionary of Western 
Philosophy may give us a starting point for discussion. According to the dictionary, the distinction 
between the public and private spheres corresponds to a distinction between the political and the 
personal and between what falls under the law and what falls outside the law. The state and social 
power ought not apply to the private sphere, which is also the borders of the public institutions of 
law. (Bunnin and Jiyuan 2004) Conventionally, the family, home, and personal taste and preference 
are private matters. Whatever the boundaries, the invasion of the private sphere is thought to be 
shameful. In contrast, the public sphere is the field of relationships that are subject to the 
implementations of law and political authority. The distinction between the public and the private is 
crucial for liberal theory to maintain the privacy-based rights and freedom of the individual 
(although other rights are based in the public sphere) and to pursue the legitimate extent of political 
authority. Could we map a similar distinction of public and private realm in Islamic context? There 
are some familiarities that can be traced, but it is hard to argue that there is an equivalent of this 
distinction in Islam. However, the impact of Western liberal law on Muslim majority countries is 
immense, making difficult to draw boundaries where the Islamic law starts and liberal law ends. In 
a sense, it is also a meaningless attempt to isolate the Islamic law from the liberal influences, as 
long as they correspond to the 'common needs' of humanity. 
  Perhaps, the first thing that comes into mind in discussing the public- private 
dichotomy in European context is the veiling practice. It has become a hot-debated issue in various 
national contexts, mostly in negative forms as in case of France where it is forbidden to wear 
headscarve in public schools. There are several reasons for the ban in various parts of Europe. 
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Salvatore (2004;1018) maintains that 'the iconic power of the veil relates to the fact that the 
secularly trained eye perceives the way it crosses, whether intentionally or not, the well-entrenched 
border between private and public spheres as the epitome of the essential threat of Islam in Europe.' 
It is seen as an instrument of proselytising or as a symbolic colonisation of the public space, which 
is supposed to be free of religion. The concern with the veiling in both scholarly and journalistic 
accounts can be interpreted as  emanating from the perception that such a symbol 'contaminates' the 
secular sacrality of public space. Indeed, the veil is a figurative `fist in the eye' of the average 
citizen, the state administrator, as well the journalist and scholar. (Salvatore 2004) 
  Salvatore criticizes Gole for her simplistic account of the Muslim publicity. 
According to radical seculars, the entry of Muslim traditions into these spheres starts with the 
question of optical perception and idiosyncratic reaction. This has led some scholars to simplify the 
analysis into an issue of `visibility', considered the final token of `publicity', through a mechanistic 
reversal of paradigms of `invisible religion'. He continues that the issue of the entry of Muslim 
traditions into European public spheres is more complex than a mere `visibilisation' and must be 
understood in relation to the history of the European formulas for the separation of religion and 
politics, and private and public spheres. The intersection of these two codes of separation that were 
crucial to the formation of nation-states is in the 'administrative delimitation of a religious field and 
its subjection to state monitoring and authority.' (Salvatore 2004) How should we see the relation 
between these codes? Asad (2005) has an interesting explanation regarding why and how religion is 
monitored by the state in modern nation state. (particularly in France.) He claims that the secularism 
has been instituted (or 'invented') to prevent the two codes to diffuse into each other.
20
 As the 
                                                 
20   
 ―Today secularism is invoked to prevent two very different kinds of transgression: the perversion of politics by 
religious forces on the one hand, and the state‘s restriction of religious freedom on the other. But this becomes 
especially difficult in secular France because there ―religion‖ continues to infect ―politics‖—at one level as the pre-
condition for a civilized public sphere (the ―Judeo-Christian values‖ informing secular France) and at another as 
parody (the ―sacred‖ character of the Republic). The idea that religion is a system of symbols, that these symbols 
can be authoritatively read by public experts publicly, becomes especially attractive in the first concern, because in 
order to protect politics from perversion by religion, in order to determine its acceptable forms within the Republic, 
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argument continues, the situation is most of the time an intermingling of the two fields. I think Asad 
is prone to see these complex relations as ramifications of 'human factor', that the human social 
interaction cannot always be controlled, apart from the particular historical grounding of the two 
fields.  
 Salvatore mentions a historical 'political principle of relaxation' that the Christianity has 
enjoyed in European nation states; 
It is historically true that the codes and instruments for action in the 
two fields (religion and state) have been subject to a substantial 
differentiation. However, on a sociological level this differentiation is 
never as neat as in the ideological, legal, institutional and concordat 
frameworks regulating the relationship between state and Church. The 
discourse according to which ‗belief‘ is the only code appropriate to 
the religious field has always been part of the policy of the state. 
Nonetheless, the institutional framework of established Churches has 
seldom contained religious activity within the confines of the private 
self and of invisible or not so visible church congregations. The 
legitimacy of the resulting ‗expansion‘ of the religious ‗code‘ has then 
been subject to explicit or implicit negotiations by Church leaders with 
state representatives, often willing to relax the principle in the name of 
a politics of mediation and concertation. (Salvatore 2007, p.155) 
 
If Salvatore's assertion is valid, the question is to what extent is this 'relaxation' applicable to the 
Muslims in Europe? There are different institutional arragements in various countries, the common 
element that characterizes the perception in these countries, however, is the fear that society will be 
                                                                                                                                                                  
authority must identify ―religion‖ and police it. This is compatible with encouraging subjects to make and recognize 
themselves through appropriate signs as proper secular citizens. So how do public spaces—saturated as they are 
with fears and ambitions, with memories and hopes—articulate ways of being worldly and unworldly? Given the 
fluid, unbounded, lateral character of so many social interactions, to what extent should we think of the public 
sphere as networks of emotional connections rather than as spaces of political debate within a hierarchical structure? 
The answers to both questions presupposes, I think, that ―the public sphere‖ in secular societies (whether in Europe 
or in the Middle East) is more than a space of communication and debate, that it is inhabited by embodied subjects 
for whom politics and ―religion‖ cannot always be easily separated. Perhaps that is why the liberal state finds itself 
having to try and impose on its citizens the disciplines and limitations that it calls secularism. ‖ (Asad 2005) 
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Islamicized through Muslim immigrants, that the state should have an immediate control and 
intervention if necessary in Muslim population. The presence of Muslims in Europe, in spite of the 
great variety of their political and religious orientations (also including various types and degrees of 
commitment to secular lifestyles and even to atheism), is often perceived by the majority cultures 
and public opinion leaders as a sectarian intrusion into an assumedly (though not really) solid 
politico-cultural body almost on a par with the infiltration of the early Christians in the social fabric 
of the Roman empire. (Kallscheuer 1994, cited in Salvatore 2006) It is probable that this perception 
is mainly determined by a refusal to acknowledge a transparant 'silent majority,' condensing the 
cultural and political attitudes of the non-activist part of populations of Muslim background, and by 
magnifying in its stead the activities of groups that carry the banner of Islam in salient way, thus 
presenting a threat — real or, more often, symbolic — to the rules of secular politics. This approach 
is not ―essentialist‖ for being crudely ethnocentric, but by virtue of the uniform procedures of 
classifying, policing, and ultimately folding religious identities and practices into assumedly clear 
legal and concordant-based frameworks of separation that contain religion in its proper ―field.‖ 
Consequently, whatever religious trace cannot be adequately ―churchified‖ according to the codified 
mechanisms of an established and conventional deal between states and churches is then perceived 
a potential sectarian challenge. (Salvatore 2006, p.554) 
  Salvatore's answer to question that whether the principle of relaxation  is applicable 
to Islam is negative, though it is in this negative respond that we observe a Euro-Islamic public 
sphere. He claims this political principle of relaxation, which on a theoretical level should be 
eguivalant to a legitimization of the contestability of the meaning and practical consequences of 
secularity, does not apply well to Islam in today‘s Europe. This cannot be too surprising, due to the 
colonial precedents that demanded a strict monitoring of religiously motivated socio-political action 
in Muslim majority countries, because of its potentially subversive character. (Salvatore 2007, 155) 
It is through this postcolonial rigidity that, by reaction, a Euro-Islamic public sphere is now 
emerging. The movement looks like 'a spiral and it manifests that, far from being mutually 
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functional, secularity and the openness of the public sphere within European modernity can be in a 
reciprocal tension, and their tense relationship is subject to continual and largely unpredictable 
transformations.' This  unpredictable transformations should be seen along with the process of 
Europeanization in the continent, that is the EU project. Lastly, Levine offers a direction for the 
research on these European transformations in general and Muslim experience in particular: 
Given the centrality of networks to the reality of Muslim experience in 
Europe, an analysis of the transformation of Muslim networks in and 
through the space of Western Europe should attempt to map and 
decipher the different (if often overlapping) transnational— and as 
important, transcultural —discourses and dialogues that comprise 
them. Through these processes Islam is being ‗renegotiated within a 
translocal public sphere.‘Yet the increasing diversification and 
fragmentation of social interests in globalising network societies also 
lead to (re)constructed identities; in the case of ‗developing‘ societies 
of the global south, ‗resistance identities‘ that emerge when 
communities lack the political-economic and cultural power to 
articulate ‗positive,‘ open and self-consciously hybrid identities. Such 
communities ‗resist, they barely communicate,‘ either with each other 
or outside the smallest circles of caring and concern. Perhaps we can 
best see Euro-Islam as comprised of numerous ‗traveling Islams‘ that 
recognise and are constituted through hybrid ity, internal difference 
and translocalised diaspora identities, and whose generally informal 
organising capabilities both influence and are transformed via the 
processes of cultural and economic globalisation. (Levine 2002, p.112) 
    
  
 
 
 III. Production of Legal Knowledge in European Context: Problems, Ambiguities 
 Maybe the most important concept in public sphere discussion in Islam is Maslaha. Maslaha 
(pl. masālih) is the abstract noun of the verb salaha (or saluha), ―to repair or improve‖. Strictly 
speaking, maslaha , like manfaʿa, means ―utility‖ and its antonyms are madarra and mafsada 
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(―injury‖); but generally speaking, maslaha denotes ―welfare‖ and is used by jurists to mean 
―general good‖ or ―public interest‖. Anything which helps to fetter mafsada or darar and furthers 
human welfare is equated with maslaha. (Khadduri 2009) It is not uncommon that the term reminds 
another concept 'utility' in political philosophy.  Maslaha differs from utility in that, theologically, it 
is not limited to this world but connects the good in this world to the hereafter, and sociologically, 
does not confine the common good to material utility, and especially not to the sum of the utility of 
various agents (Masud 1995 [1977], p.132). Moreover maslaha does not show the limitations of the 
utilitas publica of Roman law (Crone 1987, p.11 cited in Salvatore 2007). In the Roman imperial 
epoch 'the faculty to reinterpret a law in the name of the public weal degenerated into the 
prerogative of edictal legislation to undermine the traditional law and legitimize ad hoc rulings' 
(Crone 1987, p.104– 5 cited in Salvatore 2007). Salvatore argues that 'the legalistic notion of utilitas 
publica hijacked the wider normative concept of res publica, while maslaha, though suitable to a 
juridical operationalization in form of istislah, remained closer to an interpretation of res publica in 
principle uncontaminated by any compromise with contingent exigencies of the ruler, following 
maslaha inoculates the law against any abuse for an expediency dictated by considerations external 
to the legitimate interests at stake in a given situation.' (2007) 
  There is an interesting argument by Khalid Masud on how 'Maslaha' has gained such 
a critical role in contemporary production of knowledge in Islamic law. He traces the concept to the 
works of 14
th
 century Andulusian jurist, Al-Shatibi. In his lifetime, al-Shatibi (d. 1388) dealt with 
the issues of political, economic, and social change in his native Andalusia. After a decrease in 
influence that lasted for hundreds of years, Shatibi's work returned to stage in the late nineteenth 
century when Islamic reformers such as Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–
1905), made it a major reference point for their own thinking.  
  Shatibi, argues Masud, ‗develops the concept of Maslaha as the basis of rationality 
and extendibility of Islamic law to changing circumstances, but also presents it as a fundamental 
principle for the universality and certainty of Islamic law‘. Shatibi‘s most important work  was the 
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Muwafaqa, neglected by many jurists because readers needed a background knowledge of the 
political, economic, and social circumstances of the times in which Shatibi lived in order to 
understand his argument. (Eickelman 2003, p.14) It was claimed that it was this lack of knowledge 
and difficulty of understanding his works at that time made the negligence possible. Shatibi's 
contribution and newness could be evaluated within the discussions regarding what constitutes the 
aim of law in Islam. In that regard, the term Makasid al- Sharia, literally, 'the aims or purposes of 
the law', refers to the idea that God's law, the Sharia, is a system which consists aims or purposes. If 
the system is correctly followed, these aims will be achieved. From such a perspective, the Sharia is 
not only a collection of inscrutable rulings. Shatibi, probably the most sophisticated of the classical 
adherent of the doctrine of Makasid al- Sharia, states, ―the laws were instituted only for the benefit 
of the believers in this world and the next‖ (Muwāfaḳāt, ii, 2, cited in Gleave 2009). The laws 
themselves are only the tools of succeeding the God's aims and intentions. Gleave (2009) argues 
that 'the laws hold no intrinsic value, and if, sometimes, the strict implementation of the law 
compromises the aims of the Sharia, then for some supporters of the doctrine of 'Makasid', the law 
can be set aside or modified so that God's intentions might be fulfilled, this possibility has made an 
appeal to 'Makasid al- Sharia' particularly popular amongst modern legal reformers in the Muslim 
word, as it enables them to alter some long-held elements of the law which they consider to be 
impracticable in a contemporary setting.'  
  In the first part of the thesis, I have mentioned the emergence of the jurisprudence of 
the Muslim Minorities discourse that gained importance in European context.    However, this term 
has brought a lot of ambiguities, Masud argues. First of all, its semantic vagueness assumes the 
concept of a sub-nation in a nation-state framework. Religious minority is even weaker than sub-
nation or national minority since it is further split into other components like language and culture. 
Second, the problem of minority is very closely related with other minority situations, e.g. non-
Muslim and Muslim minorities in Muslim countries. Most often they are not seen in the same way. 
Third, the condition of Muslim minorities in the Western countries also separate from the Muslim 
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minorities in non-Western countries, for instance, India. It is shown that minorities in these different 
situations have to establish different sets of jurisprudence, so much so that the term minority, in 
final analysis, becomes futile. Here we see the need for help from other disciplines such 
anthropology, sociology and political science. The problems stressed by Fiqh al-Aqalliyat are not 
the questions related to Muslim minorities only. The questions are a concern for the whole Muslim 
world. Some of these questions are certainly more important and urgent for Muslims in the West, 
but ultimately the whole Muslim world has to respond to them. (Masud 2002, p.17)  
  Classical approach of Islamic legal tradition to institute a rule was based on the 
famous distinction between House of War and House of Peace. However modern Muslim jurists 
such as Al-Karadawi dismiss this methodological distinction and see the situation of Muslim 
minorities as exceptional cases that require special considerations. They approach the whole range 
of questions regarding to laws about 'food, dress, marriage, divorce, co-education, and relations 
with non-Muslims, etc.' in terms of expediency. Consequently, a whole set of new interpretations, 
often divergent, emerged. Some other jurists stated the need for new, especially formal sources. 
Various rules of Islamic jurisprudence, e.g. common good, objectives or spirit of law, convenience, 
common practice, necessity, and prevention of harm, which were invoked sparingly, gained 
significance as basic principles of Islamic legal theory. These opinions were published in the form 
of fatwas and did not constitute part of regular Islamic law texts. It is only recently that treatises 
have begun to appear on the subject. (Masud 2002, p.17) 
  The reason that these treatises have begun to emerge should be seen in a general 
frame  of a critical Islam that has started to permeate in Muslim communities. Salvatore argues that 
a particularly sensitive turning point in the emergence of a critical Islam is manifested by 'the 
perceived need to reconcile the call for participatory democracy with the reconstruction of shari‘a 
through the codification and proceduralization of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in ways that are 
adequate to the predicament of practising Muslims living in European societies. ' (Salvatore 2007, 
p.140-41) According to the approach of critical Islam, the aim cannot be confined to providing 
 55 
order in the lives of Muslims, but extends to building practical venues for their acting as citizens on 
the basis of an orientation to 'the common good.' In other words, what is good for Muslims can no 
longer be defined solely by Islamic law but has to be directed towards what is good for humanity as 
a whole. This approach should, according to Ramadan, hinder a 'communitarian ghettoization.' The 
idea of shari‘a as an overarching law binding all Muslims is not rejected but reinterpreted in ways 
that underlines the commitment to the common good and dilute, when not openly criticizing, 'the 
jurisprudential, often casuistic ramifications of this key Islamic normative idea.' (Ramadan, 2003, 
cited in Salvatore 2007)  
  Salvatore argues that al-Shatibi‘s concern for maslaha is the result of a strong 
tradition of reflection on the 'phronetic' (practical wisdom or prudence) character of human action 
that  reached its zenith during the Axial Renaissance. His theoretical elaborations were stimulated 
by the serious socio-economic changes that Andalusi society was experiencing in the fourteenth 
century.  
These upheavals made a reliance on analogy and precedent in 
jurisprudence insufficient to solve legal cases and raised the necessity 
to reconstruct broader principles of Islamic law from which to derive 
rulings. Al-Shatibi inherited from the earlier discussions, which 
spanned the period from the eleventh century to his own epoch, the 
view that the objectives of God‘s will, and therefore of the sharia, are 
simply the maslaha (the good, the interest) of the people. He was 
particularly straightforward in seeing the finality of the sharia as 
coinciding with maslaha. We find here a view of maslaha that is at the 
same time strongly objectified and quite concrete, similarly to the 
pristine Roman view of res publica. The main difference is that as a 
theoretical notion denoting good or interest, maslaha was also 
immediately applicable to the modalities of legal reasoning. It should 
be remarked that in his work on the philosophy of law, al-Shatibi 
manifested his outright distaste for any purely intellectual or 
theological discussion of sharia. Wherever unrelated to questions 
immediately relevant for action and judgment, such an abstract 
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discussion was, in his view, hostile to the scope of sharia itself. It was 
precisely on the basis of such a radically anti-intellectualistic platform 
that al-Shatibi delivered the most compelling theoretical formulation 
of Islamic notions of ―common good‖ and ―public weal.‖  (Salvatore 
2007, p. 171) 
The reason that I focus on the articulation of the 'common good' is related with the social context in 
which these ideas have emerged. The 'ulama', scholars of Islam, represent a complex scholarly 
tradition that they typically see not so much as being inseparable from Islam as constituting its very 
definition. It is with reference to this tradition that they view themselves and the world around 
them, express their ideas of an Islamic society and state, and reflect on their understanding of the 
common good. It is claimed that the 'ulama‘s conceptions of the common good are important for 
understanding not just their thinking but also the processes through which dimensions of that 
thought are expressed, as well as the public sphere in which they are constituted. What these 
conceptions of the common good are and how they are connected to the ulemas long-standing 
tradition— as well as to their contemporary contexts— are questions that have rarely been asked. 
(Qasim Zaman 2006, p.130) 
 
  Conclusion 
  How can we situate the public reasoning discussions within Islam in modern 
European context? If common good is a motive for political action and the mobilization of the    
Muslim youth around the issues of justice and social welfare is observed, then the religious norms 
here are in need of a critical re-examination as the writers above suggests. The function of the 
discussions of an emerging Euro-Islamic public sphere (surely it is an ongoing process) along with 
its concomitant tensions could be approached as a crucial element in formation of a new Europe. 
There is an argument by Levine and Salvatore (2005, p.29) that contemporary Muslim socio-
religious movements strive to formulate and implement discourses of common good that aim to 
legitimate specific forms of political community, based on specific methods of public reasoning. 
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These discourses are often in tension with modern liberal conceptions of the public sphere due to it 
rigid historical construction as we saw in citizenship discussion. They are immune to the these 
historical legacies of the political action that is rooted in the liberal norms of publicness based on 
atomistic (or hyper-individualistic) views of the social agent and contractually based notions of 
trust, by a strict interpretation of the dichotomy between private and public spheres, and by the 
ultimate basing of public reason on private interest. Socio-religious discourses and movements base 
their public reason on a practical reason sanctified by religious tradition, however variably 
interpreted. Such a perspective provides these discourses with a level of flexibility and adaptability 
that explains their success in mobilizing large numbers of people to their cause. Salih's observation 
of mixed and cross cutting belonging within Muslim youth that motivates for political activism is 
achieved through the dimension of socio-religious discourses and movements that Salvatore and 
Levine assert.  
  The tensions between Muslim political activism and liberal political action have a 
good impact on a politically more sensitive European public conscience. It is especially the 
atomistic view of social agency that made the political action indifferent towards the injustices in 
the continent and the world. On the other hand, migrant Muslim youth has learned to analyse 
critically their countries of origin thanks to their 'uprooted' position in the social environment. This 
new condition gives them a perspective to evaluate the social and political circumstances both in 
Europe and in the countries of origin, which at the end drives multi-focus and transnational oriented 
socio-religious behaviour. Indeed, this condition is not exhausted by the parochial national 
problems that capture the politics in general. One of the ways that the socio-religious movements 
contribute to the constitution and contestation of norms of public life is to provide services to their 
communities and articulating social justice claims that challenge the discourse of rights that is 
increasingly applied by the secular elites as       we saw in the 'paternalistic' discourse of the Stasi 
report on the justification of headscarve ban.  
  It is argued that socio-religious movements of various kinds articulate collective 
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identities and constitute public interactive spaces without requiring a grounding centrality of nation-
state institutions. In doing so, they 'reconstruct alternative models of the relationship between state 
institutions and the interests of grass-roots communities, often premised on their educational and 
welfare projects.' Supported by discourses of social justice, these projects have a large influence on 
the views of political community, citizenship, and legitimate authority among their constituencies. 
(Levine and Salvatore 2005, p.30) In part B I have tried to disclose the citizenship dimension 
through an Islamic notion of self which is in tension with the liberal political selfhood. Perhaps, on 
a parallel level with this tension, a high degree of communication and socio-political criticism 
within the public space that cuts through different national contexts and sources of belonging can 
give us an impression of how cosmopolitan universalism might look like in the continent. 
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